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The Italian Communist Party (PCI) emerged from the chaos of the 
Italian defeat in 1943 as a powerful and cohesive movement. Based upon 
organizational development throughout the years of Fascist rule in 
Italy, plus a combination of vigorous partisan activities and a willing-
ness to compromise politically in exchange for governmental participation, 
the PCI showed promise for achieving economic and social change in 
Italy. Conservative countermeasures and Allied pressures, however, 
diminished the Communist advantage until, by 1947, the Party was no 
longer represented in the postwar government. The success apparent in 
the economic arena due to the Christian Democrat's program initiated 
in their monocolore government of 1947 and an East-West demarcation 
internationally, with the Soviets gaining control in Eastern Europe, 
created for the general elections of April, 1948 an atmosphere ripe for 
Christian Democrat exploitation. The election was disastrous for the 
PCI; the combined Connnunist-Socialist ticket drew slightly in excess of 
four million votes, one million fewer than the coalition had gathered 
in the 1946 elections. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Mussolini came to power in 1922. Four short years later, in 1926, 
he had deprived every opposition party of the parliamentary mandate. 
Italy became a totalitarian state; the leaders of the parties who 
opposed Mussolini and his rule either went into exile and hiding or 
they were arrested and imprisoned as they attempted clandestinely to 
bring about the end of the dictatorship. 
Mussolini dreamed of Italy as a great power. His foreign policy 
was one of nationalist and imperialist aspirations. He invaded Abyssinia 
in 1935 and conquered her in 1936. He joined with Hitler in the Rome-
Berlin Axis in the same year and supported Germany's annexation of 
Austria and the Sudetenland, and in her occupation of Bohemia and 
Moravia. In 1939 Albanian borders were violated and the country subdued 
by Italian forces. Finally, in May, 1939 Mussolini formed a defensive 
and offensive alliance with Germany. 
Though he had claimed the status of a nonbelligerent at the 
opening of the Second World War, in roid-1940 Mussolini declared war on 
Britain and France in order to share in the spoils of Germany's success-
ful campaigns in the North. However, Italian troops were ill-prepared 
for the rigors of the conflict. Expeditionary forces in Libya, Abyssinia, 
and later Greece, were decisively routed. Instead of Mussolini's 
dreams of Mediterranean hegemony, Il Duce was forced to rely upon 
German forces, eventually relinquishing the perogatives of the Commando 
Supremo within its own theater. Even with substantial German support 
in Libya, Tunisia, and the Balkans, Italy's defenses were gradually 
forced back to the homeland. Tile price for German preeminence was an 
Italy left relatively unqefended in favor of Axis campaigns in the East. 
On July 25, 1943 Mussolini was deposed and imprisoned. In August 
Marshal Pietro Badoglio's government accepted the inevitable and began 
negotiations with the resurgent Allies. Nazi Germany's domination of 
the affairs of Italy, however, was not so easily dispelled. 
In September, 1943 Italy was a country divided. In the South 
the Allies had both occupied and liberated their reluctant foes. In 
the North the Germans had usurped civil authority, with Mussolini's 
neo-Fascist Social Republic as a figurehead. Faced with this set of 
circumstances anti-Fascist Committees of Liberation made up of repre-
sentatives from existent political parties began to emerge openly in 
the South and clandestinely in the North. Their immediate aim was to 
rid Italy of the Germans and the Fascists. Tileir long range aim 
concentrated on the rebuilding and restructuring of Italian society. 
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Between 1943 and 1944 a provisional coalition government comprised 
of representatives from the six major political parties and the 
monarchy was formed, and shortly after the Allied troops reached Rome 
it began to operate from that city. One of the parties represented in 
the coalition government was the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), the 
Italian Communist Party. Tile PCI had been established in Italy in 
1921 when a group of dissidents broke from the ranks of the Italian 
Socialist Party. During Mussolini's consolidation of power, primarily 
in 1926 and in the years immediately following, Communist leaders were 
either arrested and imprisoned or they went into exile. TI1roughout the 
years of Fascist domination in Italy the Communists aggressively opposed 
Mussolini and his forces. Wherever they were able--in joining Popular 
Fronts, in fighting in the International Brigades during the Spanish 
Civil War, in organizing the clandestine effort in Italy--they fought 
the Fascists. During the crucial period from 1943 through 1945 when 
the Italians were fighting to rid their country of the German menace, 
they more than any other group demonstrated acumen in the political 
arena and initiative in the Resistance movement. 
As participants in the Rome provisional government and as the 
leaders of the Resistance, the Communists clearly put into practice the 
dictates of their fallen leader Antonio Gramsci: in the South they 
carried on the "war of position" while in the North they fought the 
3 
"war of movement." The "war of position" and "war of movement" are two 
metaphors created by Antonio Gramsci in an effort to deal with the problem 
of how Communism succeeds in an advanced society. Gramsci maintained 
that revolutionary strategy is of necessity different in backward 
societies and advanced societies. The war of movement, the use of 
guerilla tactics to destroy the superstructure of society with "lighten-
ing blows at key points," is the tactic to be used in the backward 
societies. The war of position is, in political terms, the long 
campaign of "passive resistance" inside the superstructure of bourgeois 
society. The revolutionary party must work within the parliamentary 
structure on its (parliment's) own terms. Gramsci believed that the 
war of position was the primary tactic in Western advanced societies, 
but he also felt that the war of movement must be continued (in the 
factories and in the field) in order to "convert success into revolution." 
4 
As a party which was an active participant in the provisional 
governments of the resistance years, the PCI was determined to maintain 
its status. It looked forward to the postwar years when it would function 
with viability and credibility as a working party within the governmental 
structure. As the leader of the Resistance its goals were twofold: 
to drive out the Germans and to prepare for the restructuring of 
Italian society. What follows is an analysis of the role played by 
the Italian Communist Party in Italian politics and the Resistance 
movement during the years 1943 through 1945. 
CHAPTER II 
OUTLINE: THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN ITALY 1921-1941 
In looking at this particular period for the Partito Comunista 
Italiano (PCI), the Italian Communist Party, three issues will be 
explored. The first will deal with crises within the evolution of the 
Party. The second will discuss the Party and its relationship to 
Fascism, and finally, the third will concern the Togliatti leadership 
from abroad and its clandestine efforts within the peninsula. A 
discussion of these three issues serves to point out the long-term 
presence of the PC! in the Italian socio-economic scene. More importantly, 
an understanding of the roots of the PC! in the Italian national frame-
work will lead to a comprehension of the strength of the Party manifested 
during the armistice and liberation periods 1943 through 1945. 
The first area of discussion covers the early years, roughly 1921 
to 1926. In 1921 the PC! came into existence The Communist Party in 
Italy, like Communist parties in other European s t ates, came into 
being as a result of internal conflicts wi~hin a l ready existing Socialist 
parties and also because of stimulus from abroad, that is, the success 
1 
of the Bolsheviks and the appearance of German Communism. The Italian 
Socialists had for a long period been in conflic t concerning methods of 
operation based upon differences in philosophic;1.l ·:lutlook. There were 
1 Sidney Tar row, Peasant Communism in Southe:rn Italy (New Haven, 
1967), pp. 101-102. 
6 
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two main branches: the maximalists and the reformists. A new group 
arose in the Party shortly after the First World War which was in favor 
of using the war in any way to promote revolution within the Italian 
state. This new group included such leaders as Amedeo Bordiga from 
Naples and a coterie who would come to be called the Torinese intellettuali: 
Antonio Gramsci, Palmira Togliatti, Umberto Terracini, and Angelo Tasca. 
These men were the real founders of the PCI. At the Seventeenth Congress 
of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in Leghorn in January, 1921, this 
radical faction walked out of the meeting and out of the ranks of the 
PSI forever. This extreme decision was reached for three reasons: 
Firstly, and in general, the Bordiga-Gramsci faction felt no accommodation 
could be reached with the moderates or with the maximalists, secondly, 
and most importantly, they could not at all agree with the decision of 
the PSI delegates sent to the 1920 Congress of the Third International 
who had refused to accept all of the International's Twenty-One Conditions, 
two in particular. One stated that the names of parties would now include 
the word Communist as opposed to the word Sociali st; the other declared 
that all parties belonging to the Comintern would expel reformists from 
3 
their respective organizations. Thirdly, and specifically, the 
"Conununists" were disgusted with the success at the polls of the 
Socialist Party moderates in the postwar elections . For all these 
2 
The history of Italian socialism i s th" h7_s t ory of conflicts 
between the maximalists and the reformi sts . !:lte. maximalists who were 
based in Milan had as the foundation of their :: ':li ~ osophy orthodox Marxism; 
they were in favor of revolutionary action n.nc we"l'.'e opposed to participating 
in parlimentary democracy. The reformis ts su~p~ ~ t ed gradual social 
change within the framework of a parliame :~ ta:i:y '•; stem. 
3 John M. Canunett, Antonio Gramsci and t he Or igins of Italian 
Communism (Stanford, 1967), pp. 104-107. 
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reasons, the PCI had been born and it did take root. Though this was 
the case, all was not to be easy; the new party was going to have internal 
problems of its own. 
Initially the PCI had its "immediate elan of unity." It accepted 
all of Lenin's theses, evident in its Organic Act of Constitution. 
The Theses proclaimed the imminent dissolution of capitalism 
and the necessity of armed conflict between the workers and the 
bourgeois state, the hegemonic role of the proletarian party, 
and the goal of the destruction of the bourgeois state and the 
immediate establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat.4 
Underneath this apparent manifestation of unity, however, ideological 
conflict between the Bordiga camp and the Gr~ci camp was brewing. 
Bordiga was from non-industrial Naples, while Gramsci had spent his 
political life in the industrial center of Turin; in outlook they 
were definitely different. Bordiga and his followers felt that first 
an overthrow of the capitalist state must occur and then would follow 
the construction of socialism. Gramsci, on the other hand, who had 
first-hand experience amid the industrial turmoil of Turin, felt that 
the capitalist state could be changed from within as a first step 
towards, and in preparation for, the workers' revolution. Towards 
this end, he and his followers had begun to establish the Consigli di 
Fabbrica modeled on the idea of the soviets. These workers' councils 
had as their ultimate goal, through gradual escalation, the takeover 
by the workers of the means of production. In 1919 Gramsci had written: 
The socialist state already exists potentially in the 
institutions of the social life of the exploited working class. 
To tie these institutions together •.. to centralize them power-
fully ... me~ns creating from then on a true and real workers' 
democracy.5 
4 
Tarrow, pp 102-103. 
5 Tarrow, p. 103. 
8 
And during the labor movement in Turin in 1920, he and the Ordine Nuovo 
6 group had fought with G. M. Serrati concerning the possession of power. 
Gramsci and his "Communists" of Turin believed that the masses could be 
elevated only by possessing power. Serrati and his maximalists of Milan 
dictated that the possession of power was the culmination of the general 
1 . fh 1. 7 e evation o t e pro etariat. 
Amedeo Bordiga, however, totally disagreed with Gramsci's 
thinking on this point, and he accused him and his followers of espousing 
a reformist position. "Bordiga's greatest fear was that the Communist 
movement would be 'contaminated' by the values of 'bourgeois liberalism' 
and democracy, whether these values were expressed by traditional 
'democrats' or Italian Socialists. 118 As far as Bordiga was concerned 
there could be no acceptance of these values, values he saw promulgated 
by Gramsci. For him, as opposed to Gramsci, the purity of the party 
was much more important than winning over the large numbers of the 
working class. The only really important factor needed for a productive 
revolution was a "truly revolutionary elite" which would enact his 
(Bordiga's) own intractable, Marxist-oriented plan. To his way of 
thinking, there was no room for the Cons igl~ _di Fabbrica. 9 Antonio 
6 Ordine Nuovo (The New Order) was the group established by 
Antonio Gramsci in 1919 in Turin. This group--it took its name from the 
left-wing Socialist Party publication also founded by Gramsci--began the 
drive for the workers' control of the factories hy establishing the 
Consigli di Fabbrica mentioned above. 
G. M. Serrati was a maximalist Socialist leader from Milan and 
also the editor of Avanti!, the Socialist Party Daily. 
7
cammett, p. 103. 
8 Canunett, p. 159. 
9 Cammett, pp. 159-160. 
Gramsci was the winner in this internal struggle of ideology between 
himself and Amedeo Bordiga. Before his arrest in 1926, and with his 
Lyons Theses with which he set out to frame the Italian road to 
Communism, he had become the leader of the PCI both intellectually and 
politically. 
The second area of discussion under consideration also covers the 
early years 1921 through 1926, but from a different perspective. These 
are the years when Fascism was establishing itself as the only politica l 
power in Italy, and in these years is born the seed of the long-term 
struggle between the Italian Connnunists and the Fascists. What needs 
9 
to be considered during these years is the relationship between Mussolini 
and the Communists and perhaps some indication of the consequences 
which developed as a result of that relationship and which would be 
manifested during the later years of their struggle in the 1930's, 
and finally even in the Resistenza (Resistance) itself. In their 
relationship to the Fascists, neither the Socialists nor the Communists 
represented any real threat for Mussolini during the initial years of 
his consolidation of power. Either the party was weak from within, as 
was the case with the Partito Socialista I taliano (Italian Socialist 
Party), or it was unwilling to or unable to for its own reasons combine 
with other parties in an effort to stop Mussolini and his Fascists, as 
was the case with the PCI. 
Mussolini was expelled from the Social i st Party in 1914. Re 
established his Fasci Italiani di Combattimento i n 1919, and from that 
time on he used force against his former party . The split in the 
Socialist Party which had resulted in the cr eation of the Communist 
Party from its ranks in 1921, the inability of the PSI leadership to 
10 
be decisive in moments which demanded decision, and finally, the lack of 
support received by the Party in the 1921 elections, all contributed to 
providing Mussolini with a weak competitor in his bid for power. 10 
With the PSI in this weakened condition, with the PCl only a fledgling 
political party, with the government in Rome going through a series of 
crises, resulting in the fall of Facta's cabinet in June of 1922, and 
with Mussolini and his newly formed Fascist Party (November 7 to 11, 
1921) making the most out of turmoil, the situation for the anti-
Fascists was crucial. At this critical time an unfortunate action 
occurred, and though the PSI was not directly responsible, it bore the 
brunt of Mussolini's action and was yet another indication of the 
Party's general ineffectiveness. A group of trade unions called the 
Alleanza del Lavoro (Alliance for Labor) chose, without the approval 
of the Socialist Party, to call a general strike. 
This poorly timed move provided the Fascists with an excellent 
opportunity to renew their attacks on Socialists and Socialist 
centers--an opportunity of which they made the most. On 
August 2 they moved on Ancona and took Socialist Buildings by 
storm, and then repeated this operation at Leghorn, Genoa, 
Milan, and several other places. In the Lombard capital they 
threw out the Socialist municipal government, took on the job 
of running the local transportation system, and produced D'Annunzio 
to give their intervention an aura of nationalist respectability. 
Withal, they gave Italians the impression that they could and 
would save the country from anarchy.11 
The culmination of all this violence was Mussolini' s March on Rome and 
his subsequent call from the King to come to Rome to form a government. 
He was riding on a crest, and once again the Socialists, and this time 
the Communists, proved unable not only to stop ~im, but unable to even 
try to stop him. 
10 
Shepard B. Clough, The Economic Histo!:Y_ of Modern Italy 
(New York, 1964), p. 214. 
11 Clough. pp. 215-216. 
11 
He pushed through his reform of the electoral system in 1923 and 
called for new elections in April, 1924. Both the PSI and PCI were 
unwilling to or not able to--Clough speaks of their inability to--
bring their forces together in order to present a common list of candi-
dates to the voters. The Fascists were victorious. Tarrow indicates 
the PCI did not "recognize" the need to join its forces with that of 
other parties in an effort to fight the Fascists. He cites the Aventine 
secession as a case in point. When in utter disgust 123 deputies walked 
out of the Chamber as a protest against the murder of Giacomo Matteotti, 
the moderate Socialist who had earlier criticized the government from 
that very Chamber, the Communists did not as a party join the walkout. 
Later they joined the secession, allying themselves with Socialists, 
the Sturzo Christian Democrats, and others, but they "refused to seek 
the reestablishment of constitutional government, and continued to make 
violent attacks against the non-Communist parties."12 The PCI, then, 
did not in reality act out collaboration. The sub s equent consequences 
of this unwillingness or inability on the part of the PCI must be initially 
dealt with at this point. 
On the one hand, the failure to stop Fascism in the early stages 
hurt the PCI's efforts to organize within Italy a resistance because of 
the imprisonment or exile of most of its l eaders , and because of Mussolini's 
strength and tactics. These will be taken up i n the third section of this 
12 
Whether Gramsci as leader of the PCI failed to "appreciate the 
radically new nature of Fascism" as Tarrow steadfastly maintains, or 
whether he in fact did understand the true import of Fascism as is 
argued by Cammett, is an interesting digression of thought. For this 
paper, however, even if Gramsci did understand "the novel aspects of 
Fascism," and the writer leans towards this t:hes is, it must still 
deal at the level of fact. (Tarrow, p. 104.) 
12 
chapter. On the other hand, the very difficulties in communication bet-
ween the leaders who were living outside of Italy and those cadres 
working within Italy actually worked in one way to the benefit of the 
Communists. Because of the breakdown in communication the Hitler-
Stalin Non-Aggression Pact 1939-1941, which proved to be so damaging 
to the reputation of Communist parties in other European countries, 
did not have that negative effect on the PCI. When the Pact was signed 
the Italian Communists were working secretly against Mussolini on the 
peninsula, and they continued to work. By the time they received the 
message, the Soviet Union had been invaded by Germany; the International 
was once again preaching ardent anti-Fascism. "Thus when legal political 
activity began again after World War II, the PCI, unlike its French, 
German, and American counterparts, had a relatively clean slate. It 
has never ceased to profit from this record. 11 13 Finally, the very fact 
that they resisted and carried on an underground movement during these 
early years put them in a position of regional, and thus local control, 
\ 
a position they occupied when it came time to fight the Salo forces in 
Northern and Central Italy in 1944 and 1945. The Communists, thus, took 
over the local leadership of the Resistenza Armata (Armed Resistance) 
and became identified as the leadership of the Italian Resistance. This 
would, for the future, be a most important event because the organiza-
tional structure and expertise developed in their underground years 
would provide that very organization and expertise needed by them as 
a political party in postwar parliamentary Italy. 
Finally, the third area of discussion in this chapter deals with 
the Togliatti leadership from abroad and its clandestine efforts within 
13 Tarrow, p. 105. 
13 
the peninsula. The years 1926 through 1941 are the framework for these 
activities. First a general outline of the period will aid in establish-
ing a needed perspective. Secondly, three important occurrences taking 
place during this period will be discussed as further evidence of the 
PCI's increasing strength, which will culminate in its strength as a 
political reality in post-armistice Italy, and in its leadership role 
in the Resistenza Armata. 
In 1926 Palmira Togliatti happened to be in the Soviet Union 
attending the Seventh Plenum; he, thus, unlike many other fellow 
Communists, escaped arrest. The Plenum appointed him to be in charge of 
the Party Secretariat of the Italian Communist Party, and as its leader 
he carried on party activities from outside of Italy, chiefly from 
Zurich and Paris. The main thrust of activity was to reorganize party 
activities on a clandestine basis in Italy. This included sending men 
secretly into the peninsula to carry out the organization. Underground 
operations made rapid progress in Lombardy, Tuscany, Emilia, Piedmont, 
Rome and Southern Italy. In Milan itself L'Unith had a circulation of 
5,ooo. 14 
In 1927, however, Mussolini launched his counterattack against 
the Communists, and over the next few years he was able to succeed in 
crippling, if not bringing to a virtual standstill, the operations of 
the PCI. He established the OVRA (Inspectorate of Public Security) 
15 
to carry out his anti-Communist campaign. Togliatti, in his Le Parti 
14 
Fulvio Bellini, "The Italian CP Part I: The Transformation of a 
Party 19 21-1945," Problems of Communism, V (January-February, 1956), p. 41. 
15r he OVRA (Opera Vigilanza Repressione Antifascista) was the 
secret political police. It was established in 1926 at the initiative 
of Mussolini. 
14 
Communiste, speaks of this when he observes that many of the prisoners--
some of them young and some women--caught by Mussolini's security forces 
16 
were tortured until they were dead or had gone crazy. By 1928 
dozens of Communists had fallen into the Fascist net; in March of that 
year at Marina di Pisa the entire staff of the underground located 
within Italy was arrested. This turned out to be a decisive blow 
against the Communists for the short run; though the PCI center in 
France endeavored to substantially revitalize the resistance in Italy, 
they met with little or no success. The OVRA kept up a continual 
operation of capturing those new men sent in from the outside. 17 By 
mid-1934 Mussolini's efforts had reduced the PCI to a campaign which had 
as its main concentration the propagandizing of party members outside 
of Italy, namely in France and the United States. 18 
From 1936 through 1938, many Italian Communists fought against 
Franco and his Italian and German allies in the Spanish Civil War; the 
ramifications of this activity will be pointed out a little later in 
this chapter. A final note in this general outline concerns the years 
1939-1941. As was mentioned earlier, in 1939 the Soviet Union entered 
into a non-Aggression pact with Germany . When this occurred the PCI was 
forced to follow Russia's lead and thus to declare a moratorium on its 
anti- Axis maneuvers and propaganda. The Nazi attack on the Soviet 
Union in June of 1941, however, ended the Non-Aggression Pact, and 
16 
Palmira Togliatti, Le Parti Communiste Italien, trans. Robert 
Paris (Paris, 1961), p. 86. 
17 
Bellini, p. 41. 
18 
Bellini, p. 41. 
15 
Togliatti and his followers could once again pick up their activities 
against the Fascists which they promptly and forcefully did. With this 
cursory background, a second area of importance concerning the Togliatti 
leadership from abroad can now be examined. 
Three significant events took place in this time period which, 
as was laid out above, culminated in strengthening the PCI's position 
in post-armistice Italian politics and in the Resistenza Armata. The 
fi.rst event was the signing of a "unity of action" agreement between 
the Coilllilunists and the Socialists. This occurred in August, 1934, and 
its significance lies in the fact that with its creation was established 
the rivalry between the PCI and the Giustizia e Libert~ (Justice and 
Liberty). 19 A brief digression in order to provide background for this 
"unity of action" agreement is warranted at this point. 
As has been pointed out earlier, when Mussolini outlawed other 
political parties there were two choices for those who were militantly 
against him and his Fascist rule. One choice was to remain in Italy in 
the underground; inherent in this choice was the great possibility of 
arrest and confino (internment). The second choice was to leave Italy 
and fight the Fascists from the outside. Many of those who chose the 
latter emigrated to France, a country which had been openly friendly 
to the residence of these revolutionary elements. There were, thus, many 
different persuasions of political philosophy to be found in Paris 
during the late 1920's. In 1927 these exiled Italians formed the 
Concentrazione antifascista (Anti-Fascist Concentration) which was 
composed of two schools of Italian socialism, the Republicans and a 
19H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, 1953), 
p. 113. 
16 
20 
number of anti-Fascist Liberals. The Concentrazione was a loosely 
organized structure and one definitely not militant enough for some. 
In 1929 one of these men, Carlo Rosselli, formed the movement called 
Giustizia e Libert~ which was attracted to democratic ideals as well as 
to some of the welfare ideas promoted by the socialists. Its ideological 
framework rested upon what Rosselli termed "Liberal Socialism. 1121 At 
first Giustizia e Libert~ worked separately from the Concentrazione. 
There were two main divergencies of thought between the two elements: 
they could not agree on an analysis of why Fascism had conquered in 
Italy, and Rosselli's followers preached an active involvement in 
clandestine activities while they accused the others involved in the 
Concentrazione of wiling away time arguing about various resolutions 
on what to do. Finally, in 1931 the Rosselli group did ally itself 
with the Concentrazione, but other events and pressures were already in 
process which would cause that entire group to break up early in 1934. 
Mussolini and his OVRA, mentioned above, were beginning to make rapid 
headway in smashing the underground activity in Italy; this, along with 
the internal conflicts, caused the final breakup. Something else 
happened in 1934, however, and this is what was the beginning of the 
20 Shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino, A History of Modern 
Italy Documents, Readings, and Commentary (New York, 1968), p. 522. 
21 Rosselli's "Liberal Socialism" was an endeavor to shape a theory 
of modern socialism which was free of Marxist determinism. Rosselli 
was openly critical of the Marxist theory of the inevitability of the 
class struggle and of the final revolut i on. He tried to establish a 
link between the early liberal tradition of the R:!. sorgimento, from 
which he evolved his ideas of freedom and demo cracy, and socialist demands 
for the reform of Italian society. 
turn towards the Communists as the eventual leaders of the anti-
Fascist forces. 
The Communists, as should have been noted, had remained isolated 
from the intrigues ·of the Giustizia ~Libert~ and the Concentrazione. 
They considered the methods used by these other anti-Fascists as "the 
expression of an amateurish activism and an indication of lack of 
. 22 
seriousness." Their argument was that the struggle against Fascism 
was one that had to be carried out through the use of propaganda and 
agitations and strikes. They also recognized that the struggle should 
be waged by both workers and peasants together, and they were committed 
to the importance of those willing to struggle from within the under-
23 ground in Italy where there was direct contact with the people. In 
1934, as a result of the break up of the Concentrazione, and with the 
Socialists again on their own, the two wings of that party--the 
maximalists and the moderates--were able to come to an agreement and 
join forces. In August the unified Socialists signed their "unity of 
action" agreement with the Communists. Thus, in 1934, with the break 
up of the Concentrazione marking the end of a loose unity of the 
anti-Fascist political parties, and with the striking disagreement 
between the Communists and the followers of Rosselli in Giustizia e 
17 
Libertk being apparent, the two main forces in the Italian anti-Fascist 
movement had squared off against each other. The Spanish Civil War 
from 1936 to 1939 "was to provide the stage for thei r rivalry-and 
.. 24 for the eventual triumph of the Marxist bloc. 
22 
Giuliano Procacci, History of the Italian People (New York, 
1968), p. 361. 
23 Procacci, p.361. 
24aughes, p. 113. 
18 
The second event concerning the growing strength of the PCI, then 
is the ground gained by the Communists in the Spanish Civil War. In 
this war Italians from all persuasions of anti-Fascist thought joined 
the ranks to fight Franco. Two things happened: First, amateur 
fighters gained experience and became seasoned soldiers. This would have 
great significance later when these soldiers would form the ranks of 
the Resistenza in Italy. Second, the Communists clearly took over the 
leadership position among the anti-Fascist forces in this struggle. 
"By the ruthless use of the superior organization and material means 
at their disposal, the Communists had squeezed out or suppressed their 
rivals. 1125 The Communists who had all along been advocating active 
struggle seized the opportunity which came before them in Spain. 
They organized and took control of the International Brigades in 
which Italians were predominant. It is true that they did not control 
all of the Brigades; there were commanders who were from Giustizia e 
Libert~. But the Communists held the most key positions, and they saw 
to it aggressively that they were an influencing factor wherever they 
26 
were within the organization of the struggle. 
Luigi Longo and Giuseppe Di Vittorio were both Communists and 
both very influential in the Spanish campaign . Their roles further 
point out the significance of the part played by the Communists in the 
Spanish Civil War: it was their experience gei ned i n Spain which 
would form the backbone for the organizing of t~e partisan movement in 
27 
northern and central Italy. With the excepti0u of individuals, 
25 
113. Hughes, p. 
26 
114. Hughes, P. 
27 
Hughes, p. 114. 
19 
Giustizia ~ Libert~ proved to be a weak counterpart to the Communists in 
the Spanish War. Rosselli did form a small unit of his followers, but 
they paled in comparison to the aggressive tactics of the Communist-led 
groups. Rosselli himself left the campaign in 1937 for health reasons 
and was killed in Normandy by agents contracted to the Italian government. 
His death severely weakened any opposition to the Couununist-Socialist 
alliance, and this alliance was now in control of the anti-Fascist 
28 forces outside of Italy. 
The last section of this chapter has attempted to point out how 
the PCI through a gradual process gained strength and prestige during 
the Fascist regime. Two events have been discussed: the 1934 pact 
between the Communists and the newly reconstituted Socialist Party and 
the part played by the Communists in the Spanish Civil War. A third and 
final point concerning this process needs to be included in this dis-
cussion. This third point centers on the atmosphere inside Italy in 
1941. It was ripe for the resumption of underground activity, and the 
astute Communists took definite advantage of this fact. The Italian 
people had not favored Italy's entry into the war in 1940. This factor 
of an unpopular war effort, coupled with the general public apathy, 
made conditions in Italy responsive to the renewed underground effort 
29 
aggressively pushed by the Couununists. In the fall of 1941, with the 
Soviets entering the war, and with the smell of Fasc ist defeat in the 
air, the Communists began their seige. Party organizers were sent into 
Italy and into the factories of the major northern ci t ies where they set 
28 
Hughes, p. 114. 
29 
Bellini, p. 42. 
up cells and began the process of education, beginning with propaganda 
preaching the defeat of Fascism. This organization in 1941 would be 
the groundwork for strikes and agitation later in 1943, and again in 
1944, when the Communists and the Resistance were beginning to close 
in on Mussolini. 
In July, 1941 Togliatti and his Communists sent Umberto Massola, 
20 
a 37 year old Piedmontese worker and a member of the PC! external center 
to Italy. His task was to make contact with small Communist groupings 
which had somehow maintained their existence in Mussolini's Italy, and 
to renew their activities within the framework of the Togliatti Party 
still headquartered for the present outside of Italy. Massola reached 
Milan, and he began to lay the groundwork for the reestablishment of 
the PCI within the peninsula. He was successful in establishing the 
printing and distribution of L'Unitk the party newspaper. It rapidly 
gained circulation, and it thus provided a viable means to educate 
the people and to coordinate plans for the defeat of Mussolini. "By 
the end of 1941, the PCI could once more be regarded as an effective 
30 political organization within Italy." 
30 
Bellini, p. 42. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PCI SEPTEMBER, 1941-JULY, 1943: 
A TIME FOR AGITATION 
Under the provisions of the Rome-Berlin Axis, Italy entered the 
war on June 10, 1940. Almost immediately the initiative was wrested 
from her grip; in the Mediterranean her underequipped armies yielded 
a disastrous performance, and in both the Balkans and North Africa she 
had to be buttressed with German reinforcement, even then suffering 
formidable defeat in the end. As its defeat progressed outside of Italy, 
so too did the internal demise of the Fascist regime proceed. As its power 
began to crumble, attempts towards i t s sabotage gradually increased. 
The group which was to capture the le2.d ''in rallying the forces of 
revolt" against the Fascists was the PCl . It has already been noted 
above that the Communists during the years 0 f '.:h ei!:· exile from Italy 
had gained strength and experience and pr estige duough their involvement 
in Popular Fronts, their military activitie~ _·. n t ;.e 5panish Civil War, 
and their intrepid and dogged efforts i n o~;~anj z i.l~g and maintaining 
clandestine cells within Italy. The PCI in 1_9 i•l, then, was the one 
group which had worked for and had galne<l nor.ganizational preeminence" 
among those Italians who were anti-Fasc:.st. 
The focal point for the PCI in raJ. ~ yi.11.g t:1e forces of revolt 
was the working classes who comprised t h e +:v:.de union movement in the 
lH. Stuart Hughes, The United State.s anc :'.. taly (Cambridge, 1953), 
p. 175. 
industrial cities of the North. In the fall of 1941 encouraged by the 
entry of the Soviets into the war and the seemingly imminent downfall 
of the Fascists, the Communists renewed with vigor their abandoned 
underground struggle against Mussolini's regime, due to the devastating 
effect of Mussolini's secret police. 2 They sent party organizers into 
the factories of the large industrial cities to set up clandestine 
cells and to begin the spread of propaganda for the defeat of the 
F . 3 asc1sts. Their organizational abilities did not go unrewarded. 
During the latter part of 1942 and in the first four months of 1943, 
the Communists initiated and directed a long series of work stoppages 
which succeeded in disrupting war production in Italian factories, 
23 
and which climaxed in the 1943 strike at the large Fiat plant in Turin. 4 
The most important events to be recorded in the history of anti-Fascism 
between June, 1940 and Mussolini's fall were these strikes which occurred 
in the spring of 1943."5 The 1943 strikes, though they were not the 
2 See Chapter II, concerning the effect of the OVRA on the 
clandestine movement within the Italian peninsula during the 1930s. 
3 The party organizers were very task oriented. It is true that in 
numbers they were a minority--of 21,000 workers in the Fiat-Mirafiori 
plant only 80 were members of the Party, 30 at Lancia, 72 at Aeronautica, 
and 60 at Viberti--; yet, they were most efficient and proved themselves 
worthy adversaries to the endless Fascist police inside and outside the 
factories. (Roberto Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, ed. 
Giulio Einaudi (Torino, 1964), p. 49.) 
4 . In factories in the cities of Turin and Milan, workers had struck 
ten times between August and December, 1942 even though it was prohibited 
by the Fascists. (Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening 
~ountries (Ithaca, 1961), p. 449.) 
5Elizabeth Wiskemann, "The Italian Resistance Movements," Survey of 
International Affairs, 1939-1946, ed. Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, 
Vol.: Hitler's Europe (London, 1954), p. 329. 
first which had been launched against the Fascist regime, were indeed 
important in that they .demonstrated the present and the potential depth 
of feeling and action which could be aroused against the continuation 
of the war and for the downfall of Fascism. They were important for 
another reason as well: the strikes "gave the PCI virtual control of 
the working classes," and with this control the Party achieved a lever 
which enabled it to deal with the other Italian political parties on a 
6 basis more equal than it had previously been. 
The first significant strike effort of the war began some days 
24 
prior to the actual outbreak of strike activity. Instructions were handed 
out by organizers on the 20th of February, and on March 5th demonstrations 
commenced at the Mirafiori-Fiat plant in Turin. The immediate demand 
called for the Fascists to keep their promise of co~pensation for those 
7 
workers who had been bombed-out. The authorities attempted to react 
calmly, but exactly one week after the March 5 demonstrations, the Mira-
fiori workers went out on strike. 
They downed tools and walked out, demanding full payment of the 
sum which had been voted to them for the cost of evacuation (equal 
to the pay for 192 hours of overtime), and shouting in unison: 8 
'We want a subsidy for the high cost of living! We want peace!' 
6 Fulvio Bellini, "The Italian CP Part I: The Transformation of a 
Party 1921-1945," Problems of Communism, V (January-February, 1956), p. 42. 
7 Though this was the immediate demand, the workers had many 
grievances: the economic chaos caused by the war, the ever-increasing 
gap between wages and prices, "worsening condi tions in the factories, and 
the feeling of helplessness on the patt of workers to defend their 
families and themselves from the bombfo.g raids carried out by the British 
and the Americans." (Roberto Battaglia, T:ne Story of the Italian 
Resistance, trans. Peter CUDllllins (LondL·n;· l957), p. 32.) 
8Roberto Battaglia, The Story of t he ~ t alian Resistance, trans. 
Peter Cummins (London, 1957), p. 33. 
On March 13th the strikers achieved some results; 300 lire was offered 
to every man who would go back to work and "maintain discipline." 
With this the strike in Turin abated, though some of its leaders were 
9 
arrested and put to death. The strikes, however continued outside of 
Turin. Activity spread to other large factories in Piedmont, then to 
those in Lombardy, Liguria, and the lower Po Valley. In the city of 
25 
Milan the strikers succeeded in closing down the Pirelli, Breda, Borletti, 
and Marelli factories. In all of these locations the Fascists were forced 
to come to terms with the workers by granting them the increases in 
10 
wages they demanded. 
For the Fascists the 1943 strikes s~gnaled a new phenomenon in 
Italy: an effective organized opposition to their rule. Two points 
serve to make this clear. First, it was the first time that the 
Fascists had experienced a powerful demonstration which was directed 
against them, and they were not able to deal satisfactorily with it. 
The Fascists, though they employed police both inside and outside the 
factories, were unable to break the strikes and had to acquiesce to 
the demands of the workers. When, on the 2nd of April, they announced 
that an increase in pay would be forthcoming, they pointedly added that 
they had decided to pay each person a little extra in celebration of 
the April 21 anniversary of the founding of Rome. This only served to 
point out further the weak position from whicP they were then operating. 
"Behind this demagogic pretext, it conceaJ~c its impotent fury at the 
11 
check it had so suddenly received." 
9 . W1skernann, Survey of International A~_:f?i rs, p. 329. 
10 Neufeld, p. 449. 
11Battaglia, The Story of the Italian Resistance, p. 33. 
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The second item which makes clear the impact of the 1943 strikes on 
the Fascist regime deals with the long-range ramifications of the 
strikes. As the sentiment expressed in the diary of a member of the 
Fascist hierarchy indicated, "the implications of the strikes could 
not be laughed off •.. for now that the workers had won an economic round 
against the dictatorship, they probably would turn next to political 
goals. 1112 The strike action of 1943 and the tumult it caused instilled 
in the workers a confidence in themselves as a force with which to be 
reckoned. Because of their impact in Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria, and 
other places in the North, they now moved in force from a position 
of defense to one of offense: the workers realized their own combative 
capability vis-a-vis the Fascists. For the first time the overthrow 
of the regime by their own hands became a possibility and not merely a 
13 hope. On the eve of the March strikes those same leftist leaders 
(the Cormuunists, the Socialists, and the Actionists) who had initiated 
them and who would carry them out, met together at Lyons in France and 
affirmed their desire to proceed in the task of destroying the political, 
economic, and social elements which had made Fascism possible, re-
establishing democracy in Italy, and rebuilding the state in a manner 
14 
which would ensure the supremacy of the workero. Out of the conference 
at Lyons came an anti-Fasci&t document which for the first time recognized 
12 Charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies The Italian Anti-
Fascist Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 209 . · 
13 Battaglia, Storia della Resistenz~ 1:.~!~ana, p. 50. 
14A description of the Socialist Party (~SIUP ) and of the Action 
Party (PdA) is included in Chapter IV. 
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explicitely and unanimously the need for a national insurrection 
pledged to overthrow the enemy. It called for demonstrations in the 
streets, strikes to sabotage war production, the organization of partisan 
groups to fight the enemy, and in general, for the Italian people to 
affirm themselves anti-Fascist by taking up arms and striking out at 
the Germans and the Fascists wherever and whenever possible. 15 Indeed 
the political goals would follow. The Resistance movement with its 
partisans and Committees of National Liberation in the North, as well as 
the Central Committee of National Liberation at Rome, would provide the 
1 d hi f h 1 ' d f f h F . 16 necessary ea ers p or t e u timate e eat o t e ascists. 
In addition to l'urto (the impact) which the March strikes had 
on the Fascist regime they also strengthened the Italian Communist Party 
in a political sense. Throughout 1941 and 1942 the Communists had done 
their job and had demonstrated their skills and their perseverance in 
organizing and mobilizing the workers in the factories. Even more 
important than this, however, was their ability to know and to express 
the needs of the workers and their discerning aptitude to choose just 
the right moment when to arouse the key potential force of the working 
classes, that of solidarity. The Communists as has already been pointed 
out made the most of this aptitude: the 1943 general strikes through-
out northern Italy, which were the culmination of two years of hard work 
at organizing and mobilizing, gained for them wna t amounted to effective 
control over the working masses. With t-.h :ts control established, the 
PCI next sought to consolidate forces in ar; ef fort to carry out the 
15Battaglia, Storia della Resis tenza _i ~_?__li~na, p. 51. 
16 
See Chapters IV and V. 
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pledge promulgated at the Lyons meeting. In the spring of 1943 the Party 
sent a delegation to Rome to confer with representatives of the monarchy 
and the army. The PCI suggested that all three forces join together in 
an effort to overthrow the Fascists. It guaranteed that it could suspend 
work in all the factories of Turin, Milan, and Genoa. From the beginning 
the CoUDllunists made it clear to the representatives from the South that 
they were operating from a base of strength and not from one of weakness. 
In return for their ability to drastically damage Axis war production 
as part of the effort to overthrow Fascism, the PCI leadership wanted 
the assurance that the future anti-Fascist government would drop any 
discrimination against it as a viable political party. 17 It was 
precisely because the PCI had stabilized its leadership, through the 
March strikes, over the working classes of the North that it was willing 
to risk carrying on negotiations with the monarchy and the army. 
Without that base [the control of the working classes) any 
offer or proposal indicated inevitably the acceptance of its 
[the PCI] own subordination to the initiative of the monarchy. 
With that base, the operation assumed instead the character 
of an endeavor to use the Crown for its own ends and the danger 
of being used [by the King) instead, if even existent, was 
reduced to the minimum possibility.18 
Though PCI leadership had been achieved in the North, this fact did 
not produce immediate results. The Party's offer to aid the King and 
his forces in Rome was met with resistance and inaction. The Christian 
Democrats were uncertain about the Communists and tended not to trust 
them. The Liberals, surprised by their attitude, had difficulty 
convincing themselves of the CoUDllunists' sinceri ty. In the end the 
17 Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza ~~aliana, p. 54. 
18 Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, p. 53. 
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Roman leaders seemed to shy away from a plan "so explicit and so binding." 
The talks hung in the air and no decision was reached. As late as 
July 20, 1943, in a final effort, the Communists sent a mission, 
headed by Ludovico Geymont and Concetto Marchesi, to Rome to try once 
more to reach an agreement. They informed the leaders there of the 
unanimous desire on the part of the anti- Fascist Committee of Milan 
to proceed alone in its plans for insurrection if no help was forth-
coming. 19 Five days later the Italian situation had changed radically; 
on July 25, King Victor Emmanuel III summoned Mussolini and dismissed 
h . f 20 1m rom power. 
19 Bat t aglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, p. 53. 
2011with the fall of Mussolini on Jul y 25, 1943, and the conclusion 
of a separate armistice between Italy and the Allies on September 8, the 
Communists emerged as the strongest polit1ca :1. fo rce in central and 
northern Italy. Scores of experienced Communist l eaders, released from 
Fascist prisons and penal islands unde r the amnes t y ordered by the 
Badoglio Government a month before the armis tice , r esumed their place in 
the party and further increased its efficlency . " (Bellini, p. 42.) 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PCI AND POLITICS JULY, 1943-DECEMBER, 1945: 
A TIME FOR CONCILIATION 
The period from summer 1943 through spring 1945 was one of 
rebuilding and resistance in Italy. In the North the partisan forces 
were fighting to drive the Fascists and the Germans out of Italy. In 
the South, the newly formed Italian government was struggling to begin 
the task of rebuilding the country. While the Italian Communists 
were fighting "the war of movement" in the North, the Italian Communist 
Party was fighting the "war of position" in the South. 1 A close 
look at the internal politics in Italy during this period reveals that 
the PCI's goal was to continue to participate in the government and 
from there to broaden its base of political power, as opposed to 
pursuing intransigent revolutionary methods. The Party was more 
interested in debating issues and working out solutions to problems 
within a parliamentary framework than concentrating on the immediate 
annihilation of the system and the establishment of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. 
Putting aside the revolutionary 'maximalism ' of its origins, 
the PCI's policy was flexible and accommodating : the party care-
fully avoided getting involved or committed on questions of 
1 The story of the part played by the Commtmists in the Resistenza 
Armata will be considered in Chapter V. The present chapter will 
discuss the role taken by the PCI during a per i od when it participated 
i n the Italian government. 
principle and ideology, preferring the substantial political 
advantages to be achieved by viable tactics.2 
I. BACKGROUND 
The explosive forces in Italy, feeding on the inefficient, 
31 
corrupt, moribund, Fascist state, were set in motion on the afternoon of 
July 24, 1943 when the Fascist Grand Council met and by a majority of 
19 to 7 voted to restore all military and constitutional power to the 
3 
King Victor Emmanuel III. This sealed the fate of Mussolini; the 
resolution in effect called for the ousting of the Fascist leader, 
and of the regime. On the morning of the 25th the King had appointed 
Marshall Pietro Badoglio to take over the reins of the government as 
Prime Minister. 4 Mussolini, in conference with Vittorio Emmanuel later 
in that same day, learned of his dismissal, which was promptly followed 
by his arrest. He was transferred to Ponza and later to Gran Sasso, 
high in the Apennines. On September 12th Captain Otto Skorzeny with 
ninety Nazi paratroopers "swooped down to rescue Mussolini. •. 115 He 
was quickly transported to Hitler's headquarters where the German 
leader informed him that if he wished to return to Italy he must 
establish a new pro-Nazi government, try the members of the Grand Council 
2 Giuseppe Manunarella, Italy After Fascism A Political History 
1943-1965 (Notre Dame, 1966), pp. 69-70. 
3The Fascist Grand Council was the supreme body of both the state 
and the Fascist party. 
4 Ironically Badoglio had served as a soldier under the rule of 
Mussolini. He was, in fact, one of those who in 1928 approved Mussolini's 
parliamentary reorganization plan, when it was put to a vote in the 
Senate. 
5charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies The Italian Anti-Fascist 
Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 261. 
who had engineered his ouster, and acquiesce to the German occupation 
of several border provinces. As a result, on the 16th of September, 
1943, Mussolini announced over Radio Munich to the Italian people the 
organization of the Partito Fascista Repubblicano (Fascist Republican 
Party), along with the main points of the program of the Fascist Social 
Republic. The attempt to rebuild a new Fascist state complete with 
Fascist army had begun. Meanwhile, for the Allies and for the Badoglio 
contingent, political and military events were also moving, sometimes 
not with as much speed as was desired. 
On July 10 the Allies had landed in Sicily, and one week later 
32 
the Allied Military Government had come into existence in Italy. 6 Before 
the end of July, martial law had been proclaimed in Italy, Badoglio 
had formed a Cabinet, and the Fascist Party had been outlawed. The 
armistice agreement between the Badoglio government and the Anglo-
Americans, however, was not reached with comparable alacrity. Mussolini's 
government had fallen July 25; yet, the armistice was not agreed upon 
until September 8. The negotiations for the armistice were convoluted 
and drawn-out for perhaps two reasons. First, the Anglo-Americans were 
not prepared for what they considered the early fall of Mussolini; 
consequently, they were not ready for the problems contingent upon 
Italy's request for an armistice. The representatives of the Allies, 
for example, would not discuss with the Italians anything regarding 
future peace-treaty conditions. They also refused to talk about final 
6There were two Allied governmental structures in Italy. The 
Allied Military Government (AMG) was established in Sicily on July 17, 
1943. The Allied Control Connnission (ACC) was established in Brindisi 
on November 10, 1943. The ACC and its operations were usually carried 
on to the rear of the battle lines while the AMG functioned in the forward 
zones under the direct connnand of the local Army Headquarters. 
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territorial settlements, the pre-Fascist colonies, and the future size 
of the Italian army. Second, the Italian government appeared to be 
too "optimistic" about the terms of the armistice. The Italians in general 
expected gentle treatment at the hands of their former enemies. The 
King and his advisers had been persuaded, probably as a result of 
Allied propaganda, that the elimination of the Fascist regime by the 
Italians themselves would effectively modify the Allied attitude of a 
7 harsh peace for Italy. 
The fact remains that Marshal Badoglio had already by mid-
August set on footsteps towards the conclusion of an armistice 
with the Allies, while at the same time playing the difficult 8 game of keeping the Germans in the dark as to Italian intentions. 
The important focus for this work, however, is not the machinations 
of either the Anglo-Americans or the Italians in their efforts to achieve 
an armistice. The important point is the negotiations were allowed to 
drag on from July to September. The Badoglio government failed to 
realize that the German reaction to a separate armistice on the part of 
Italy would have indeed been a violent one, and consequently failed to 
take any steps that might have mitigated the reaction. 
Instead of prompt and determined action, Badoglio delayed the 
start of negotiations with the Allies and gave the Germans, who 
with Mussolini's fall had become highly suspicious of the 
Italians, enough time to send more troops to Italy. By the 
end of August, a month after the dictator's collapse, the 
Germans had enough forces in Italy to be able to control any 
move of the Italian Army.9 
7 
Mammarella, p. 22. 
8 Muriel Grindrod, The New Italy Transition From War to Peace 
(London, 1947), p. 9. 
9 Maunnarella, pp. 21-22. 
34 
It is a fact that on July 25 when Mussolini fell, only seven divisions 
of German soldiers were present in Italy. Added to this, Badoglio 
and his government had some modest strength available in the Italian 
home reserves and in the entire population, including Fascists who 
had not reacted negatively to the July 25 overthrow. 10 
At this point it is significant to emphasize the importance of 
the following two factors. First, by the middle of September, 1943 
Italy had within its borders three different functioning governments. 
In the South, the Allied Military Government under the direct command 
of the local Allied Army Headquarters had been established in Sicily on 
17 July. As the Allied forces fought their way northward, the AMG also 
moved northward. In Rome, the King and Marshal Badoglio had formed the 
Italian anti-Fascist government, with Badoglio convening his first 
11 
cabinet on July 26. In the North, on the 16th of September Mussolini 
had announced the formation of his new Fascist Social Republic in his 
desperate effort to re-establish the Fascist state with the help of 
Hitler and Germany. On Septemb.er 23 he announced his new cabinet, 
and his government took up residence in Salo, a small town on the western 
shore of Lake Garda not far from Verona. The second observation to 
be made is that Italy was a country divided. By the end of September, 
1943, it had become painfully clear to the Italians that, though an 
armistice had been reached, the war for them was not over. The Allies 
having landed in Sicily and Salerno and on the Adriatic coast, had control 
10 Mammarella, p. 21. 
11 On September 10 the Germans occupied Rome. King Victor Emmanuel 
and Marshal Badoglio fled further south to Bari from which they continued 
to run the Italian government under the direction of the AMG. 
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of most of the South. The Germans, due in great part to Badoglio's 
delays, had infiltrated and now controlled the northern and central 
parts of Italy as an occupying army, and had on September 10 occupied 
the city of Rome. In October the Italians decl~red war on Germany, 
becoming a co-belligerent of the Allies, but it would not be until 
spring of 1945 that Italy itself was liberated. 12 
Italy is a relatively young nation; she achieved unification only 
by 1870. It can be reasonably posited that the short fifty years 
which intervened between 1870 and the coming of Fascism in 1922 did 
not supply enough time "to establish the habit of parliamentary method 
d i . f li . . d i d . . 111 3 an to tra n a generation o po ticians verse n emocratic practice. 
Italy can be likened to a young child growing up and learning one set 
of values, when Fascism came on the Scene and arrested that growth and 
development. As has already been noted earlier, those people, and more 
to the point, those politicians who disagreed with the Fascist experience 
either went into exile, were arrested, or simply took no part in public 
life. All of these men who had been active in government and who would 
be active again in the post-Fascist era, came back to governmental life 
after twenty years of inactivity within the Italian state structure. The 
one element they had in common was their anti-Fascism. The problems 
arose when these different men, representing different political parties, 
disagreed on the degree to which they desired to change Italian society 
and on the kinds of changes they were willing to make. 
12 The King dragged his feet on the issue of declaring war on 
Germany. There were several reasons for his hesitations; these are 
discussed adequately in Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies The Italian Anti-
Fascist Resistance, pp. 315-318. 
l3Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy Politics and Economics 
1945-1955 (London, 1955), p. 6. 
.•. while the revolutionaries of the twenties now planned 
with renewed ardour to change everything and build afresh on 
new foundations, the more cautious and orthodox aimed instead 
at going back to the point where the 'wrong turning' had been 
taken and resurrecting the pre-Fascist State intact.14 
These differences in how to restructure Italian society in the post-
Fascist postwar era form the foundation for the political crises which 
plagued the Badoglio, Bonomi, and Parri governments in the years 1943 
through 1945. Before moving on to analysis of these crises, and in 
particular before looking at the role of the PCI in these political 
machinations, some specific background information is called for -
outlining the political parties and their arrival on the scene after 
the fall of Mussolini. 
II. COMITATI DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE 
Comitati Di Liberazione Nazionale (Connnittees of National Liber-
36 
ation) emerged at the beginning of 1943. These were anti-Fascist commit-
tees which had been active underground. Early in 1943 when Mussolini's 
fall was imminent, leaders from the old (pre-Fascist) opposition 
parties had resurfaced. These leaders, along with many younger men 
who knew only the Fascist experience, formed in several cities Anti-
Fascist Freedom Fronts which were the forerunners of the Committees of 
National Liberation. Together the Committees embodies the willingness 
of anti-Fascist factions to put aside their political differences for 
the moment and to join together to rid Italy of the new Fascist forces 
of the Social Republic and the Germans, and to restructure the state along 
democratic lines. Very soon after the fall of Mussolini CLNs mushroomed 
14 Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 6. 
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throughout Italy--many were clandestine in nature due to German 
occupation--even though the Badoglio government had officially prohibited 
any organized political activity. Beginning with Rome, CLNs appeared 
in many cities: 15 Milan, Turin, Florence, and elsewhere. Later the 
Rome organization called itself the Central CLN (CCLN) to distinguish 
it from the CLNs in other cities. Later still, the CLN in Milan changed 
its name to CLN dell'Alta Italia (CLNAI), CLN for Upper Italy, in an 
effort to handle more efficiently matters which affected the occupied 
North, particularly the military resistance. Despite the differences 
in name, however, the CLNs represented the political spectrum, from 
extreme left to extreme right, and from the beginning of their public 
debut they involved themselves in a propaganda campaign to inform 
people of the current situation and to encourage them to actively 
16 participate in the changes needed. At its first public meeting the 
Rome CLN invoked "all Italians to the struggle and to the Resistance, 
and to reconquer for Italy the place it deserves in the community of 
nl7 free nations. 
After the reality of the armistice, then, the CLNs proved themselves 
to be a positive force; they grew in number, and most importantly, they 
1511When Ivanoe Bonomi's (member of the Labour Democracy Party) 
Anti-Fascist Committee, meeting in a house on Via Adda early in the 
morning of September 9, 1943, heard the news of the royal-military 
government's "hegira" to Brindisi, it sought to fill the political 
void. At the suggestion of Labor Democrat Ruini, it voted that afternoon 
to rename itself the Committee of National Liberation (CLN), in the 
style of the French CLN that had been crganized in Algiers a few months 
earlier." (Delzell, p. 271.) 
16 
Mammarella, p. 36. 
17 
Delzell, p. 273. 
appeared in all of Italy--in the South and in the occupied central and 
northern areas of the peninsula. The Rome CLN laid the groundwork for 
the first active resistance against the invading Germans. In the 
liberated South the CLNs provided the focus for political activity. 
In the northern and central portions of the country the Committees 
resorted to secret activities in their fight against the German and 
Fascist troops. 
In both cases they symbolized the union of all anti-Fascist 
forces, different with regard to ideological background and 
political programs, but all equally determined to act together 
for the rehabilitation of Italian society from its Fascist 
past.18 
III. THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
By early fall in 1943 there were six (in some regions more) 
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major political parties represented in the CLNs of southern and central 
Italy and five parties represented in the North. 19 These parties, 
after an absence of twenty years from the Italian political scene, 
once again openly resumed activity. They were able--at least during 
the two year period until total liberation--to combine and work together 
in a connnon effort to solve Italy's immediate probelms. From right to 
left the CLN parties were the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Democratic 
Labor Party (PDL), Christian Democracy (CD), the Action Party (PdA), 
the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), and the Italian Connnunist Party (PCI). 20 
18 Mannnarella, p. 36. 
19 
Mammarella, p. 36. 
20 Delzell, p. 207. PSIUP stands for Socialist Party of Proletarian 
Unity (Partito Socialista di Unita Proletaria). This was the official 
"denomination" of the Socialist Party from 1943 until 1947. 
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The one party not represented in the CLNs of northern Italy was the 
Democratic Labor Party; the followers of this small political group 
were almost entirely based in the South. The essential characteristics 
of these parties in the Italian political spectrum in 1943 are summarized 
as follows: 
The Italian Liberal Party (?LI) 
The Liberal Party was the furthest to the right of the CLN 
parties. It was also the oldest of them in terms of political exper-
ience and historical tradition. It can be traced back to the Risorgi-
mento, "not so much as an organized party in the modern sense but rather 
as a current of ideas or a political orientation. 1121 The political 
class which was responsible for the Risorgimento and which held 
political supremacy in Italy from 1860 to the coming of Fascism was 
liberale. 
This term does not correspond conceptually to that of the 
American "liberal"; it must be considered within the framework 
of Europe in the second half of the 19th century. Liberalism 
in that period meant acceptance of parliamentary democracy, 
laissez faire principles in economy, the recognition of the 
fundamental freedoms, tempered, however, by the necessity to 
safeguard and maintain a political system from which the working 
classes were excluded. In Italy, the Liberal Party provided 
the cadres for the ruling class which, having initially started 
from the progressive positions of the Risorgimento2~eriod, 
ended in a conservative defense of its privileges. 
This conservative orientation asserted itself once again when the PLI 
23 first emerged as "a full-fledged party" in the fall of 1943. 
2~mmarella, p. 37. 
22 Mammarella, pp. 37-38. 
23 
Delzell, pp. 219-220. 
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When it did return to the scene in 1943, as a political group, 
it returned with considerable prestige. It had within its ranks a 
number of very outstanding intellectuals: Benedetto Croce, Giolitti, 
Vittorio Orlando, Antonio Salandra, Luigi Einaudi, and Francesco 
Ruffini. These were men who voiced "magnificent scorn of Fascism." The 
following words, inspired by Croce, and read at the first congress of the 
reconstruct~d Liberal Party held at Naples in June, 1944 were exactly 
what the CLNs and the Italian masses wanted to hear: 
Fascism was a giant evil genius •.. which made bad taste a 
science. It had a senile cunning in evil; it does not deserve 
to be honored by involving the mythical figures of Ahriman or 
Satan, for it deserves another name, more apt 2~d not imaginative 
but prosaic. It should oe called human folly. 
Besides being a party of some import, the postwar PLI was a 
divided party. The conservative orientation, already mentioned above, 
and a progressive orientation were coming into conflict. This conflict 
arose out of the different regional or professional backgrounds of PLI 
members. In the one camp, university professors, students, lawyers, 
and other professional people were genuinely interested in promoting 
progressive ideas. They sensed the times in which they were living and 
"were well aware of the necessity of orienting the country toward a 
25 
modern and intelligent reformism." In the other camp, landowners, 
mostly from the South, and small or big businessmen composed the 
24 Margaret Carlyle, Modern Italy (New York, 1965), p. 65. 
Benedetto Croce was a world renowned philosopher who remained in 
Italy during the years of Fascism. Throughout the r egime he continued 
to publish his journal La Critica which was highly critical of Mussolini 
and Fascism. He was not harmed probably because of his reputation. 
He was a Southerner and, of course, a member of the PLI . 
25 Mammarella, p. 40. 
conservative orientation of the party. These particular men, no 
matter what liberal beliefs they cherished, "had tradition, not to say 
26 
reaction, in their bones." Specifically, this faction was 
in favor of the restoration of the political and social 
conditions that had existed prior to Fascism. For them, the 
'old values,' that is, the values of pre-World War I liberal 
society, remained unchanged. Disregarding the social and histor-
ical evolution that had taken place, they thought that a return 
to these v~lues would solve the problems of the new Italian 
democracy. 7 
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Though this internal conflict within the party continued for several 
years throughout the postwar years, the political position of the Liberal 
Party itself remained essentially conservative and opposed to concrete 
changes in society. Many of the members demonstrated an almost exaggerated 
proclivity for law and order, for legal and constitutional tradition 
and practice. Thus, a considerable proportion of the party cadres, 
though not supportive of the current King, were predisposed towards 
28 
the monarchy as an institution. In the realm of economics the 
party line adhered to Croce's assertion that "the party of freedom 
29 
need not descent to mundane affairs and formulate a specific program." 
In concluding, though they were staunch advocates of political liberty, 
the liberali were unable to comprehend the demands for social and 
economic justice exacted by the working classes; in the end they 
channeled their political action towards the defense of the interests 
of the upper classes. 
26Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 18. 
27 Mammarella, pp 40-41. 
28Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 18 . 
29 
Delzell, p. 220. 
42 
The Democratic Labor Party (PDL) 
This member party of the CLN was the party which was represented in 
the southern and central Italian Committees but was not represented in 
the North. Its leaders were for the most part men who had been involved 
in politics for a long time. For example, Ivanoe Bonomi and Meuccio 
Ruini, both leaders of the PDL in 1943, were former Socialists who had 
turned their backs on the party in 1912 because their reformist 
posture did not mesh with the revolutionary maximalism of the majority. 
In terms of the program which they offered, the Labor Democrats 
have been described as standing midway between the Action Party and the 
Liberal Party. The PDL platform was first published in Rome on July 26, 
the day after the fall of Mussolini. It called for 
... popular self-government and parliamentary supremacy; •.. 
progressive and extraordinary taxation; the principle of the 
'nation in arms'; regional autonomies; free public schooling, 
even through the university; inviolability of freedom of the 
press and of organization .•• [The party] favors all reforms 
that may raise the dignity of labor and labor's rights with 
respect to capital, [provided] that the State's e~onomic 
framework be not suddenly endangered. 11 30 · 
In particular, and in the main, they differed from the Actionists in 
that the majority of the Labor Democrats desired to maintain the 
institution of the Monarchy; in fact, they, unlike ;the Actionists, 
staunchly refused to actively propagandize against the House of Savoy. 
Secondly, they did not agree with the extent to which the Actionists 
31 favored socialization. In concluding, the program of the Democratic 
30 Delzell, p. 219. 
31 Delzell, p. 219. 
Labor Party differed only slightly from that of the mainstream parties 
and because it was unable to attract a popular following; it "faded 
out" after 1946. 32 
Christian Democracy (CD) 
The Christian Democrat Party which emerged in 1943 was the direct 
heir of the Partitio Popolare Italiano (Italian People's Party), the 
modern and progressive Catholic party founded by the Sicilian priest 
33 
Don Luigi Sturzo in 1919. Several of the Partitio Popolare leaders 
endured the years of Fascism, some in prison, others in exile. In 1942 
and 1943 they, along with fresh advocates, initiated renewed, secret 
political contacts. In these years they laid the foundation for a new 
Catholic progressive party to be known as Christian Democracy. They 
supported Alcide De Gasperi as their leader and spokesman, and they 
leaned heavily on the Church for help in restructuring the party 
organization. 34 This was supplied through Catholic Action and the 
32 Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 19. 
33 The Partitio Popolare was against imperialism, insisted upon 
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proportional representation, the vote for women, and the breaking up of 
large uncultivated estates for use among peasants. Further, it demanded 
total separation of the state from Church influence and called for more 
local autonomy as opposed to excessive centralization. (Mammarella, p. 52.) 
34 The political career of Alcide De Gasperi predates the First 
World War when he was a representative to the Austrian Congress in 
Vienna from the city of Trento. Prior to the war the Austrian Empire had 
under its administration the towns of Trento, Trieste, Balzano, and 
Gorizia and their territories. After World War I the Italians gained 
these territories, and De Gasperi was elected to represent them in the 
Italian Parliament. During the Fascist years De Gasperi was persecuted 
and put into prison. Upon his release from confinement, he retired to 
the Vati can where he worked quietly as a librarian. 
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lower clergy, the latter of which had direct contact with and reasonable 
influence over the common people. 
The political program of the DC in the postwar years emulated 
that of the Partito Popolare. The chief points in its platform were 
the division of church and state, the authenticity of the Lateran 
Agreements, the establishment of regional governments and the strength-
ening of communal institutions, total freedom for the workers to organize 
trade unions and their right to take part in the management of businesses, 
public social insurance, progressive taxation and land reform. Especially 
important to the platform was a solid statement defending Christian 
values and a call for good relations with the Catholic Church. 35 
The Christian Democrats succeeded in enticing into their ranks 
probably the widest cross-section of the population. There were 
farmers and industrial workers (though among the working classes the 
party's main strength lay in the agricultural areas) co-existing with 
representatives from the petit-bourgeosie and from industrial management. 
This circumstance provided the stage for a party with a definite class 
character, from progressive left to the extreme right. 
While the necessity of mediating between these currents 
assigned a center position to the DC in the Italian political 
spectrum, historical necessity and the interplay of internal 
tendencies often compelled the party to switch alternately 
from the center to the right or the left.36 
An example of this was De Gasperi 1 s willingness to participate in the 
government with the Communists, at least during the war years. He 
35 
Maromarella, p. 57. 
36 
Mammarella, p. 57. 
firmly believed that his Catholic party was obliged to collaborate with 
secular democratic forces in an effort to ensure the viability of 
37 democracy in Italy. 
The Action Party (PdA) 
The Action Party, unlike Christian Democracy)was not the direct 
heir to any political party existing prior to the twenty years under 
Fascism. In fact (although it had been in de facto existence since 
45 
July, 1942) it did not emerge as a party w~th a program until the begin-
ning of 1943. A large proportion of those who formed the ranks of the 
PdA had been adherents of Giustizia ~ Liberta, the political movement 
founded in 1929 in Paris by Carlo Rosselli and other exiles living in 
38 France. These Actionists, through a series of underground meetings, 
were finally able to agree upon a program; in July, 1942 they made 
public their seven-point program: 
1. Abdication of the Savoyard dynasty, co-responsible with 
Fascism for the country's ruin, and establishment of a Republic; 
2. Regional automony and economic equalization of the regions; 
3. Nationalization on a flexible basis of large industrial 
monopolies; 
4. Radical agrarian reforms and land redistribution; 
5. Restoration of labor union provileges to factory workers 
and permission for them to share in industrial management; 
6. Full religious freedom, and separation of Church and 
State; 
7. Promotion of a European federation of free democratic 39 
states within the framework of still broader world collaboration. 
The leaders of the Action Party were proposing to establish a new 
party that would cut itself off from the political t raditions of the past 
37 Delzell, p. 216. 
38 . Giustizia e Liberta is discussed in Chapter II. 
39 Delzell, pp. 213-214. 
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and would become the tool for a "liberal revolution. 11 They had as 
their goal the joining together of workers and the petit bourgeoisie, 
elements which had been won over by Fascist propaganda "when they had 
been irritated and frightened by the Socialists and had easily succumbed 
to the Fascist appeal of th.e 'party of order.'ffO The Action Party's 
official stance promulgated the idea that the working class and the small 
middle-class must be educated as to where they stood: their common 
enemy was the large industrial entrepreneur who was in turn the epitome 
of all the traditional conservative forces--the monarchy, the aristocracy, 
the higher echelons of the army and civil service, and the higher clergy. 
The Action Party was not moved by theories, as was the case with the Liberal 
farty, but instead taught that each social and economic problem should 
be confronted and solved in a concrete fashion, and done so with the 
welfare of the masses of people in mind. 41 
The Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP) 
Immediately to the right of the PCI was the Italian Socialist 
Party. It had been founded in Italy in 1892, had all but disappeared 
from the political scene in 1926, and reappeared once again in August of 
1943. Italian socialism got a late start--in 1892 socialism had already 
taken root in France, Germany, and Britain--probably for two reasons: 
40 Carlyle, p. 51. 
41carlyle, p. 51. Two outstanding political figures were members 
of the Action Party: Count Carlo Sforza and Ferruccio Parri. Both of 
them fought Mussolini throughout his years in power, Sforza from exile 
and Parri in the underground. Both were also active in politics during 
the period 1944-1945; Sforza served as Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 
the first Bonomi government, and Parri was Prime Minster in 1945. 
first, the industrialization of Italy after its unification moved at a 
I 
very slow pace, and second, extremely backward conditions plagued the 
country, particularly in the South. 42 The party did fade from the 
Italian political scene after 1926, but as has already been pointed 
out, so did every other party in Mussolini's regime. The Socialists, 
however, like the Christian Democrats, continued to exist and to keep 
in contact during the period from 1926 to 1943; in fact, socialism was 
"well represented among the exiles in France and was a movement rich 
in leaders. 1143 In August, 1943 Pietro Nenni, Bruno Buozzi, and others 
succeeded in re-establishing the party under the new title Partito 
Socialista Italiano di Unita Proletaria (PSIUP). 44 This group named 
47 
Nenni as secretary-general and director of Avanti!, the party newspaper. 
Two observations should be noted concerning the Socialist party. 
The history of the party seems predicated upon conflicts between the 
42 Mammarella, p. 41. 
43 Carlyle, p. 58. 
44 Pietro Nenni was born in 1891 and was a journalist by profession. 
He published The Spectre of Connnunism in 1920, a book in which he 
explained his switch to the Socialist Party (from the Republican Party). 
He was an outstanding man, intensely anti-Mussolini, fighting him first 
from exile and then, after August, 1943, in the undergrotmd. In that 
same year he was elected President of the Socialist Party. Among his 
accomplishments were the creation and responsibility for the publication 
of Avanti, the clandestine newspaper, and after the war he held political 
office in the Parri government and the De Gasperi government. 
Bruno Buozzi was a labor leader who had been active in labor in 
pre-Fascist years. He had headed the Italian Federation of Metallurgical 
Workers (FIOM) and had become Secretary-General of the General Confed-
eration of Labor (CGL). He emigrated in 1926 and re-entered Italy in 
1943. He was largely responsible for the Pact of Rome agreement in 1944 
which established the CGIL, a labor organization composed of Communist, 
Socialist, and Christian Democratic leadership. In 1944 he was captured 
and shot by the Germans. 
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maximalists and the reformists. As these two groups fought amongst 
themselves, causing splinterings and break-offs from the party, during 
the period between the founding and the Second World War, so these 
conflicts between the maximalists and the reformists would flare up again 
in the years following World War II. For example, the moderate faction 
of the party, led by Giuseppe Saragat would break away from the PSIUP 
in 1947 and form the Italian Workers' Socialist Party to demonstrate 
opposition "to the pro-Communist 'fusionist' tendencies of Nenni's 
. . 45 
maJority faction." The second observation to be registered concerning 
the Socialist party is a comment on its activities after it had resurfaced 
as a political force. As will be seen in the following chapter, the 
Socialists played an active role in the partisan resistance of central 
and northern Italy, in scope and importance being second only to the 
Communists. Besides their partisan role, they were represented in the 
Committees of National Liberation where they took an active, not passive, 
posture. During the time from 1943 to 1945 they were, as were the 
Communists, both anticlerical and antiroyalist, though as will be seen 
in the final segments of this chapter (relating to the Communists), 
both they and the Communists did not accentuate their opposition because 
their overriding purpose was to remain in the government. 
The Italian Communist Party ' (PCI) 46 
At this particular juncture it need only be indicated that 
in 1945 at the beginning of the postwar era, the PCI was in an 
45
shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino, ~~istory of Modern 
Italy Documents, Readings, and Commentary (New York , 1968), p. 549. 
46An accounting of the Italian Communist Party, more detailed 
than that found above in the discussions of the other parties repre-
sented in the CLN, can be found in Chapter II of this work, "The 
Communist Party in Italy 1921-1941." 
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ascending position of strength. The party set out in this period already 
imbued with three very enviable 11assets. 1147 The first advantage the party 
had was the existence of an organization which had remained viable from 
an early stage through clandestine efforts from abroad and within 
the Italian peninsula; this intact organization was superior to any 
48 
other party structure. The second advantage held by the party was 
growing support from the industrial working classes in the North, support 
which had already been demonstrated in the factory strikes of 1943, 
49 beginning in the Fiat-Miraf iori plant in Turin. The final advantage 
of the Communists was their involvement and leadership in the Resistenza 
50 Armata. 
IV. ISSUES: THE BADOGLIO MINISTRIES 
26 July, 1943-5 June, 1944 
The chief issue to be discussed in this section, and the problems 
surrounding it, occur during the period prior to April, 1944 when the CLN 
finally joined the Badoglio cabinet. The issue itself pivoted around the 
Monarchy, or the institutional question as it had come to be called. 
The immediate central question posed was whether the CLN would be willing 
to form a government with the King Victor Emmanuel whose, in the words of 
Benedetto Croce, "clear will to make use of institutions and men of 
47Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 15. 
48 See Chapter II, "The Communist Party in Italy 1921-1941. 11 
49 see Chapter III, "The PCI September, 1941-July, 1943: A Time for 
Agitation." 
50 See Chapter V, "The PCI and the Resis t ance September, 1943-May, 
1945: A Time For Aggression." 
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Fascism, [and whose] •.• long delay in declaring war on Germany, made nece-
ssary his retirement. 1151 This central question concerning the monarchy 
and the way in which it was treated, and in effect solved, by the PCI is 
the main focus of interest in considering the Badoglio ministries from 
1943 through 1944. 
As was seen earlier, Marshal Badoglio had formed a cabinet almost 
immediately after Mussolini had been dismissed. As late as 1944, 
however, his cabinet did not include in it any of the political parties 
represented in the CLNs. Instead, it was made up of "technical experts' ' 
who were carrying on as the government, in effect, as if the anti-
Fascist parties and Colllll\ittees did not exist. The British-American 
military authorities realized that this was a situation which could not 
continue; they recognized the need for a wider political base in the 
government. They therefore requested (in fact, it had been among the 
conditions for the recognition of Italy as a co-belligerent that the 
anti-Fascist parties be included in the government) that the King call 
upon the six anti-Fascist parties to join his cabinet. Two factors, 
however, were present which caused delay in bringing about this change. 
First, the King dragged his feet so to speak because he was hesitant 
52 
in having any factions in his cabinet who would not support his monarchy. 
It has also been argued that Victor Emmanuel feared that with an opening 
to any of the political parties, Communism would be provided with "a 
53 logical wedge to force its way into the cabinet." Second, and most 
51 
Delzell, p. 325. 
5~arella, p. 61. 
53 Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries 
(Ithaca, 1961), p. 452. 
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important for current purposes, was the trenchant resistance towards 
the monarchy, either on a personal basis which was the case with the 
Liberals and several others, or on an institutional basis which 
was the case for the leftist parties. The Liberal Party, some segments 
of the Christ~an Democrats, and all of the anti-Fascist conservative 
groups supported the institution of the monarchy but would have nothing 
to do with either Vittorio Ennnanuel or his son, Crown Prince Umberto. 
As far as they were concerned these two men had openly cooperated and 
co-functioned with Mussolini and his Fascist regime, and they were 
. 54 thus unacceptable as representative of the monarchy. The feelings 
of the leftist parties--the Connnunists, the Socialists, and the Actionists--
took a different tack. They were in opposition to a monarchical 
kind of govenunent. They approached their opposition from a philiso-
phical point of view, rather than from a reaction to Victor Emmanuel's 
guilt by association. To the leftists the monarchy was the symbol of 
tradition, order, privilege, and Fascism. '.flle institution itself 
simply did not mesh with the socio-economic changes they proposed 
55 for Italian society. 
As the year 1944 emerged, the existing Italian government found 
itself unable to move forward towards meeting the British-American 
54 
Mammarella, p. 62. 
55 Delzell, p. 328. The King's answer to the accusations made 
against him was that he bore no political responsibility. He maintained 
that Mussolini's rise to power was the direct result of the inability 
of the democratic parties to organize against him. (Mammarella, p. 63.) 
56 demands for inclusion of the anti-Fascist parties in the government. 
While the conflict continued, accompanied with proposals and counter 
proposals from various elements, new situations which touched on the 
problem were continuing to develop. The nari Congress which convened 
on 28 January, 1944 was one of these situations. As the CLNs gained 
more and more political voice in the liberated South, they began to 
act in concert. The Committees requested permission to convene a 
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national convention in Naples on December 20, 1943. The AMG refused to 
grant their request, basing their refusal on regulations prohibiting 
political meetings in AMG territory. The Allied Control Counnission, 
however, quickly interceded and persuaded Marshal Badoglio to allow the 
Congress to meet in the town of Bari which was in that part of Italy 
occupied by the King. The Rari Congress was important because it 
signaled the first free political assembly to meet openly in Europe 
since the Nazis overran the Continent. "The congress did not, of course, 
mark the birth of free political parties, but it signaled their first 
dramatic bow on the public stage. 57 Bari was, however, also important 
for other reasons which relate to the continuing story of conflict 
discussed above. 
56
nuring the conflict the AMG at different times lined up with 
one or the other side. Mammarella states that the Americans definitely 
favored the anti-Fascist parties, at least after Adlai Stevenson's 
fact-finding report on Southern Italy had been presented to the 
State Department. The British, on the other hand, representing Churchill's 
attitude, were generally on the side of the monarchy. They had 
little faith in the political prowess of the political parties, and 
they feared extremism. (Hammarella, p. 64.) 
57 Delzell, p. 332. 
53 
58 Two key proposals were aired at the Congress. The first proposal 
was introduced before actual formalities began. It was sponsored by 
the three leftist parties and set forth the manifesto that the Congress 
itself was the legal Italian government, and as such, the Allies must 
now deal with it instead of with_ Marshal Badoglio. This proposal died 
quickly, due in large part to the influence of Benedetto Croce. A final 
outcome, deriving from this defeated proposal, was the formation of a 
junta which was comprised of representatives of the six parties, and 
which acted as a standing committee of the Congress. The importance 
of the creation of this junta must not be minimized during this period 
of conflict for "This [junta] was the germof the six-party coalition 
of 1944-5. 1159 The second key proposal aired at the Congress--and this 
one was passed--demanded the abdication of the King and called for the 
institutional problem to be decided by popular vote at the end of the war. 
This compromise on the viability of the monarchy was realized because 
the southern PCI, "engaged at the moment in a furtive flirtation with 
60 
Badoglio, failed to give vigorous support to the leftisits' resolution." 
5811on a different plane, one of the most important achievements 
of the Congress of Bari was the fotmdation of the Italian General 
Confederation of Labor (CGIL, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), 
which merged into the same labor organization the Counnunist, Socialist 
and Christian Democratic workers unions. This act achieved a unity on 
the labor front similar to that reached among different politic~! forces 
already existing in the CLN. 11 (Mammarella, p. 66.) 
59w. Hilton-Young, The Italian Left A Short History of Political 
Socialism in Italy (London, 1949)., p. 166. 
60nelzell, p. 333. There appears to have been a difference in 
attitude between the southern and northern PCI. Southern leaders 
appeared to want to shelve the conflict and concentrate on driving the 
Germans out of Italy. There was even a rumor that the PCI would join 
the Badoglio government. The "coquetry" of the southern Counnunists 
was not appreciated by their northern counterparts. 
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This open willingness on the part of the PCI to bend politically can 
be viewed as the first fragment of evidence that Italian Connnunism 
in 1944 and in the postwar years would hold as its highest priority 
participation in the Italian government. The Togliatti return to 
Italy, with his almost immediate decision on the monarchy, forms 
another bit of evidence supporting this contention. 61 At the conclusion 
of the Bari Congress, the political parties had come together enough 
to agree upon the monarchy; however, no joint cabinet had been formed. 
The King still defied abdication. 
The conflict over the monarchy became increasingly fierce before 
it was finally (at least for the immediate future) resolved. The 
British renewed pressure to retain the monarchical institution while 
the ACC Political Section worked out a specific plan for abdication. 
In February, 1944 Enrico De Nicola, a political leader from Naples, 
finally persuaded the King to agree to abdication in favor of his son 
Prince Umberto. Still, final agreement among all parties concerned 
hung in the balance. The left-wing parties would not accept Umberto 
because of his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Italian forces in 
62 1940 when Mussolini had declared war on France. It was at this point 
that Palmira Togliatti arrived in Naples from Moscow. And it was at 
this point that the PCI, under his leadership, facilitated an agreement 
between King and political parties, making it possible for Marshal 
Badoglio to form a cabinet with the six anti-Fascist parties in 
membership. 
61Togliatti's decision concerning the monarchy will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
62
ailton-Young, pp. 166-167. 
Straight from the fountainhead of authority, he swung the 
communist leaders right round overnight; the communists would 
henceforth be prepared to collaborate in the government with 
anybody at all, with the King, with Badoglio, with black 
Catholics, with laissez-faire liberals. Now was no time for 
sterile gestures of disapproval; the war must be won in colla-
boration with anyone who was prepared to win it. At the same 
time communist propaganda in Naples suddenly increased and 
demonstrations became more businesslike.63 
Thus, Togliatti, speaking for the PCI, voiced no objection to colla-
borating with Badoglio even with the King remaining on the throne. 
The PCI's "realistic approach" was accepted by both the King and 
. 64 
the Allies. The other political parties, if somewhat reluctantly, 
also accepted the PCI attitude as workable. The formal agreement was 
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reached on April 24 and was based on the De Nicola plan mentioned above. 
This plan called for the transfer of all royal powers from the King to 
a Lieutenant General, provided that the King would retire from the throne 
without the necessity of abdicating, and ensured that Umberto, the son 
of Victor Emmanuel, would become Lieutenant General. 65 Thus, a new 
government was formed; it was still under the premiership of Marshal 
Badoglio, but it had within its membership representation of all the 
CLN parties. 
Togliatti's PCI "svolta" laid the foundation for the future of 
the party. Two items are of particular note. First, the svolta assured 
the Communists of participation in the government. In the April, 1944 
Badoglio cabinet, they were given the Department of Agriculture, and 
63 Hilton-Young, p. 167. 
64 Mannnarella, p. 67. 
65 Mammarella, P. 68. 
66 Togliatti was made minister without portfolio. Th.is membership in 
the government continued through successive ministries (to 1947), and 
provided the party with a base from which to strengthen their impact 
upon the Italian people. Second, the svolta established a pattern 
of behavior for the Communists which was to continue through the years 
1944 and 1945 and beyond that. Tiley were intent upon remaining in 
the government. 
There was evidently going to be no more of the Bombacci-
Bordiga tradition of intransigent political virginity, but a 
determination to get into the government at all costs. For the 
communists, the most implacaole, incorruptible and gallant 
of the anti-Fascists, to lead the way in co-operating with a 
monarch who was compromised even in the eyes of a convinced 
monarchist like Signor Croce was a break with tradition that 
showed how far above other aims did they rate the getting of 
placed in the government. They did not thereafter revise 
this rating.67 
In conclusion, an understanding of the circumstances which facilitated 
56 
the final agreement between Badoglio and the six anti-Fascist parties is 
crucial to comprehending the behavior of the Italian Communist party in 
the years 1940-1945 (and beyond). As noted earlier the PCI, from the 
moment Togliatti took command in Italy, set aside its revolutionary 
intransigence and assumed a posture which was flexible and accommodating. 
The party eschewed involvement or commitment on philosophfcal questions. 
They opted for practical political strategy. 
V. ISSUES: THE BONOMI MINISTRIES 
9 June, 1944-12 June, 1945 
The presence of crises did not end with the agreement which had 
brought together in the government Badoglio and the anti-Fascist 
66 Manunarella, p. 69. 
67ttilton-Young, p. 168. 
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parties. Before long, in fact, the Marshal resigned, never to be Prime 
Minister again. In early June the Allies marched into Rome and liberated 
the city. At this time the De Nicola plan went into operation; the 
King transferred his powers to his son who became the Lieutenant General, 
and Badoglio prepared to form his second government with the six parties 
as he was directed to do by Umberto. Badoglio was in trouble from the 
beginning. The Central CLN (CCLN) still chafed at working under a 
Prime Minister who had openly functioned under the command of Mussolini. 
More importantly, and particularly on the part of the Socialists and the 
Actionists, the CCLN viewed itself as the ultimate constitutional auth-
ority. Thus, it exerted pressure to be recognized as such thereby 
68 
reducing the Lieutenant General to nothing more than a "figurehead." 
Marshal Badoglio in the end bowed to CCLN pressure; he informed the 
Lieutenant he would not form a new government. Umberto was compelled 
to offer the Badoglio post to the man supported by the CCLN; on June 9 
Ivanoe Bonomi, the seasoned Labor Democrat, formed a new government. 
There were two governments under the leadership of Bonomi, and the 
Conununists served in both of them. The conflicts between the political 
parties of the CCLN which transpired during the duration of these two 
governments serves to further illustrate the pattern of behavior exhibited 
by the PCI and outlined above in the description of its conduct during 
the Badoglio cabinet. The actions of the Communists under Bonomi 
demonstrate first a firm decision to remain in the government, even 
at the cost of flexibility and compromise concerning men and issues. 
Second, their actions testify to a keen interest in broadening their 
base of power from within the government coupled with an incisive 
68 Mammarella, p. 72. 
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awareness as to how to maneuver their position in order to accomplish 
this aim. Evidence to support the above description of the PCI can 
be shown through analysis of the two major points of dissension which 
plagued the Bonomi ministry. The first dealt with the purpose of the 
CLNs themselves, both on a local level and at the cabinet level. 
The second concerned the political purge of ex-Fascists from all areas 
of public life. 
As was demonstrated above, the Central CLN had become powerful 
enough to oblige the Lieutenant General to choose their candidate for 
Prime Minister when they no longer wanted Marshal Badoglio. The CLN 
at the local level had also achieved a considerable amount of power. 
In liberated Italy they operated in most of the towns and villages, and 
because they were the only political forces available, besides the 
Fascist ones previously existing there, they were the ones given ad-
ministrative powers upon liberation at the hands of the Allies. The 
AMG, as a matter of fact, because they were not familiar with the local 
situations, tended to depend upon local CLN government. For the above 
69 
reasons, the local CLNs "became the arbiters of local life." 
There was disagreement among the political parties of the Central 
CLN as to how much power these local CLNs should in fact exercise. The 
Liberals and other conservative elements, because they were interested 
in preserving the pre-Fascist status quo, obviously wanted to curb the 
authority of the local CLNs. It was in their mind that when the Italian 
government regained control over the liberated portions of their 
country, the normal channels of administration would be resumed at the 
69 Mammarella, p. 75. 
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expense of the local CLNs. These normal channels--prefetti, police 
chiefs, local bureaucrats--were the pre-Fascist traditional channels 
70 
they so much pref erred. The rightist parties were patently interested 
in continuing their influence and in running their country, after 
the war ended, in a way which would be beneficial to them. The leftist 
parties, on the other hand, the most vociferous of which were the 
Socialists and the Actionists, desired to strengthen the local CLNs for 
the purpose of weeding out traditional elements; their aim was to utilize 
the CLNs as a base from which to facilitate the social and economic 
changes they foresaw for postwar Italy. The Communists, though they 
supported the Socialists and Actionists on a theoretical plane, would 
in the end be willing to lose ground on the local CLN issue through 
their direct compromise on the purge issue. This will be demonstrated 
shortly; first, one other observation needs to be asserted. 
The conflict over the role of the local CLNs was related directly 
to the purge of Fascists from the administration of government. None of 
the anti-Fascist parties disagreed with the premise that Italian political 
life must be purged of those who had collaborated with Fascism. It seemed 
reasonable, on a moral basis, to punish those who by compromising with 
Fascism had gained at the expense of the Italian people. This is where 
agreement ended, however, for the political parties. Those on the 
right were interested in prosecuting members of the "Fascist hierarchy and 
71 Fascist profiteers." They did not want the purge to extend beyond the 
70 The pref etto ia a goverU1llental official of high rank who speaks 
for the government in the province. He has ultimate authority in the 
province, even exercising this power aver the locally elected officials. 
7~arella, p. 77. 
leaders because a purge of such magnitude would encompass those classes 
of people which would form the bulwark of their political support 
once elections were again legal in Italy. The Liberals and the 
Christian Democrats both needed the support of the former ruling 
72 
class in order to establish a viable political base. The leftist 
parties, on the other hand, and this included the PCI, viewed the purge 
as political in function. 
In order to build a new democratic society it was first 
necessary to eliminate the old political class, which stood for 
values contrary to democracy and whose political approach 
was strongly tied to Fascist mental habits and methods.73 
60 
To get rid of the leaders of Fascism, then, was not the sole aim of the 
leftist groups. Their plan adamantly demanded that broad segments of the 
governmental bureaucracy, the army, and the economy be cleansed of any 
and all individuals who had fraternized with Fascism either overtly or 
merely by a sympathetic attitude. 
Regardless of the position taken by the leftists concerning the 
Fascist purges, the PCI, when it came down to choosing sides, opted to 
compromise--and to compromise substantially--on the purge issue. Their 
actions pinpoint another indication "that the ruling passion of the new 
type of communism was government office. 1174 Added to this, through their 
compromise, they gained ground politically testifying to their constant 
awareness for astute maneuvering within the government. 
The argument over the role of the local CLNs and the purge 
continued for months, producing many tense moments in the first Bonomi 
72 Mammarella, pp. 76-77. 
73 Mammarella, p. 76. 
74 
Hilton-Young, p. 175. 
cabinet. For the rightists matters had been made more intense by the 
appointment of a Communist, Mauro Scoccimaroo, to be the "High Commis-
75 
sioner for Epuration." They accused Scoccimarro of purging too many 
officials. When, late in November of 1944, he sought the expurgation 
of particular finance and maritime officials, pa&sions erupted. The 
Navy Minister Admiral DeCourten and the Treasury Minister Soleri (PLI) 
61 
immediately resigned. Bonomi backed them solidly and went so far as to 
76 demand the dissolution of the office of High Commissioner for Epuration. 
Feelings were sq acute that Bonomi resigned as Premier. 77 
Bonomi's resignation of itself caused another crisis. When he 
resigned he offered his resignation to Umberto the Lieutenant General, 
thus publicly acknowledging him as the executor of constitutional 
authority. This was a stinging affront to the leftists, particularly 
to the Socialists who detested the monarchy and who were committed to 
constitutional authority residing in the CLN. "Bonomi patently 
was dissociating himself from any conception of a new political order 
78 based on supremacy of the CLN over the old state apparatus." With 
all this trauma, a new Premier had to be chosen. Consultations for 
a new government begcµi on the 26th of November, 1944 and continued for 
about fifteen days. With the blocking by the British of Count Sforza 
75 Hilton-Young, p. 172. 
76 
Delzell, p. 399. 
77 rw.o other reasons which contributed to the downfall of Bonomi 
were the British attitude towarda Count Sforza and the problem of the 
relationship between the Rome government and the local CLNs. Regarding 
the first, the British had blocked Count Sforza from becoming Foreign 
Minister in the first Bonomi cabinet. Regarding the second, the local 
CLNs resented the appointment by the Rome CLN of their local officials. 
78 Delzell, p. 460. 
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for Prime Minister, the three rightist parties finally agreed to support 
79 
"England's man" Ivanoe Bonomi as the person to form a new cabinet. 
The Socialists and the Actionists adamantly declined to join the 
government in opposition to Bonomi. Nenni had, at the onset of the 
crisis produced a manifesto stating that the Socialists would not truck 
with a reactionary monarchist such as Bonomi if he ever formed a second 
government. The PSIUP held fi.rm to its expression in the manifesto. 
This refusal .on the part of the Socialists surprised few, if any. When 
Togliatti's Communists announced their intention to join the Bonomi 
cahinet, however, tfie atmosphere 111ust have oeen reminiscent of his 
April svolte during the Badoglio government. "The Communists, as always, 
proved to be more accommodating and although they maintained their 
80 
reservations with regard to Ronomi, they agreed to cooperate with him." 
For Bonomi's second government the Communists appeared to be model 
partners. "The communists continued to show themselves pliant in practice 
although rigid in theory .•• Signor Togliatti followed his declared policy 
of collaboration with the Regent and the forces of reaction'for the moment' 
81 
-'per adesso.'" 
For the Communists themselves, the second Bonomi government 
mirrored both failure to advance changes which they had advocated and 
79 
Delzell, p. 461. 
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Kogan in Italy and the Allies maintains that one possible reason 
for this action on the part o! the. fCl was the desire on the part of the 
Sovieta. to keep in powex in Ualy "~ak, ineffective,. and unprogressive 
groups to improve the praS:l?ectfl. o~ a late:r successful Communist seizure 
of pow:e:r." CNorxnan Kogan, !:taly- a.nd tlie Allies (<',;a,noridge, 19'56 J, p. 183. 
81ttilton-Young, p. 176. 
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in gaining positions in the government which were useful in strengthening 
their influence nationally. On the negative side, though the power of 
the national CLN had been upheld, the functions of the local CLN "were 
82 
sharply limited, to merely consultative functions." Along with this, 
the extent to which the political purge would be carried out was cut 
drastically; the High Commission in charge of the purge operation, 
which ha~ been a committee of the CCLN, was abolished, and the orders 
for purge were transferred to jurisdiction of the judicial courts. 
1be courts invariably moved more slowly and with more leniency than 
83 had Scoccimarro and his coIIDnittee. On the positive side, · the 
Communists gained influence in the Bonomi cabinet. Togliatti became a 
Deputy Prime Minister. Antonio Pesenti served as Minister of Finance, 
and Mauro Scoccimarro gained the post of Minister for the Occupied 
Territories. The position captured by Scoccimarro turned out to be an 
important one for the Communists. It provided for them a vantage 
point within the resistance movement. 1bus, an examination of the 
Bonomi governments does indeed show, the PCI, chiefly through its 
willingness to be flexible and to come to compromise, in a position of 
give and take. They gave on a couple of issues they had advocated, more 
power for the local CLN and a continuance of the purge at high levels; 
yet, unlike the Socialists, they were the ones who were in the government, 
and by being so they gained of fices and thereby had a base from which 
to exert their influence. 
82 
Mammarella, p. 79. 
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Mammarella, p. 79. 
VI. ISSUES: THE PARRI MINISTRY 
19 June, 1945-24 November, 1945 
64 
Ferruccio Parri came into office on the shirtails of the vento del 
nord, the ''wind from the north." The vento represented the spirit of 
the heroic resistance efforts in the North which many hoped would provide 
the catalyst for social and economic change in the Italian state now 
that the war was over and the business of rebuilding could be resumed 
wholeheartedly. Parri had been the supreme chief of the partisan forces; 
he was popular and as such his choice as leader of the government was 
received wholeheartedly by those who had been a part of or who identified 
with the Resistance. This enthusiasm was in no way matched by the CCLN 
which had actually selected Parri. At the time he was being considered 
for office, forces had been solidifying within governmental parties for 
some time and now that the war had ended crystallization of ideas was 
imminent. Within the CCLN the Christian Democrats on the one side and 
the Communists and the Socialists on the other side were already 
squaring off against one another. This had gone to the point that neither 
of these major parties was willing to give on an issue which might enhance 
the political strength of the other party. Thus, the DC blocked the 
possibility for a Nenni Prime Minstership, giving as their ostensible 
reason the idea that a Socialist leader would not be looked upon kindly 
by the Allies. Likewise the Socialists obstructed the way for a De Gasperi 
84 Prime Ministership for reasons of the same genre. Ferruccio Parri was 
the man the parties were finally able to agree upon. 
As an individual Parri's rating is high. "He was a man of great 
organizing ability, absolute rectitude and freedom from spite, and of a 
84 Mammarella, p. 96. 
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positively eccentric modesty--even humility. 1185 He thrust himself into 
his job, working very long hours and sometimes sleeping in his office. 86 
Granted this on the positive side, Parri had never before served in 
goverrunent; he therefore was lacking in important experience. Also, 
while in prison in Switzerland early in 1945, he had gone on record as 
one who eschewed the actual play of politics. 
If he could, he said, he would prevent the Party from taking 
part in ordinary politica and from holding office and would 
encourage it to give its best men to the civil service and to 
the non-political organs of reconstruction which, it was to be 
expected, would be doing the §'tailed and useful work of 
administration after the war. 
Whatever positive or negative attributes can be dredged up in an effort 
to evaluate Parri in a role he had been cast in, he did face Herculean 
88 
problems which demanded immediate attention. Whether his failure in 
office--he was forced to resign a mere five months after he resumed his 
duties--was attributed mainly to his own inherent shortcomings or 
chiefly to the unwillingness of the political parties to come to terms 
with each other, and thereby come to terms with the issues facing them, 
is perhaps, a moot question. Nevertheless, one factor is true, and for 
purposes here, is important. The PCI, indirectly or behind the scenes, 
85 Hilton-Young, p. 181. 
86 Delzell, p. 563. 
87 
Hilton-Young, p. 182. 
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These Herculean probelms consisted of "fighting the inflation 
and black market which were reducing millions to destitution; compromising 
the Augean problem of epurazione; healing sectional wounds; handling 
noisy Sicilian separatists; defining the borders against Yugoslav and 
French pretensions; preparing for elections that would shape the 
political institutions of the new Italy; and satisfying some of the 
demands for land reform." (Delzell, p. 563.) 
worked to the disadvantage of the Action Party and Signor Parri. They, 
more than any other group, were consciously responsible for his 
inability to succeed in what he set out to do. 
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Ferruccio Parri fashioned his government around two goals. First, 
the nation would continue the fight against Fascism not merely on a 
legal basis, but also on a moral basis. Second, social and economic 
change must have as its foundation nothing less than complete structural 
reform of Italian society. 89 The first goal met with a complicated 
situation. With the liberation of northern Italy and the end of the war, 
Italian society faced a mass readjustment to a normal society problem. 
The social and economic landscape was glutted with war veterans, resis-
tance fighters, and ex-prisoners of war; with the country already in 
a state of physical and financial ruin, there was little hope that these 
people could restructure a decent life in the innnediate future. To this 
situation of increasing discontent--unemployment was rampant--was 
added the availability of weapons left over from the war and the 
resistance movement. As a result the potential for violence was 
established, and many political demonstrations ended in violence. 
The reaction of Parri to this state of affairs was in line with his 
goal of fighting Fascism on a moral basis. He was the leader of a 
·democratic state which was totally anti-Fascist in his view. As the 
head of such a state, he could never react with "police repression" 
to the demonstrations of those people who had put their lives on the 
line to rid their country of the odious Fascists. "He was committed 
to realize in the political life of the country the values that had 
89 Mammarella, p. 103. 
67 
90 been established by the resistance movement." Morally, he could 
not send the police and the Carabinieri to fire upon the people for 
exactly the same anti-Fascist values he and the government (supposedly) 
were conunitted to. 
The political ramifications of this atmosphere--both the action on 
the part of the masses and the reaction on the part of Parri--are 
extremely important. 
The absence of adequate public powers was deplored by the 
propertied and the privileged and soon the 'strong state' was 
regretted and the use of energetic means of repression to bring 
about order advocated. After a period of disorientation the 
forces that traditionally had controlled the economic power 
began to react to what appeared to them as an emergency situation, 
attempting to retake the initiative lost to the popular classes. 
In this case the industrial haute bourgeoisie, who desired a 
rapid reconstruction of industry in order to defend its 
privileged position, allied its interests with those of the 
petit and middle bourgeoisie, ... Such a state of affairs bred a 
reactionary spirit with its traditional class hatred.91 
The political representatives of the forces discussed above reacted 
in kind towards Parri. Because he would not deal concretely with the 
demonstrations, they accused him of being weak and partial to those 
responsible. Even more than just accusations and criticisms within 
the cabinet, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals openly and publicly 
harangued Parri's actions through the information media over which they 
had control. These circumstances succeeded in establishing an "atmosphere 
92 
of hostility" that crippled the Parri government. One last reference 
to the problems which confronted Parri's efforts to carry out his first 
90 100 . Manunarella, p. 
91 99. Mammarella, p. 
92 Mammarella, 100. p. 
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goal of dealing with the vestiges of Fascism on a moral basis should be 
mentioned. This concerns the purges which had also plagued the Bonomi 
governments. 
The middle classes were opposed to extensive purge, and extensive 
to them meant any purge at any level that involved them. Parri's 
intent was to broaden the purge operation which had been reduced as a 
result of the arguments endemic to the Bonomi governments. The Actionists, 
the Socialists, and the Communists not only supported this move, they 
demanded it. Indeed, Palmiro Togliatti had been given the portfolio 
of Justice, and he was ready and willing to act. It is almost anti-
climactic to assert the position of the middle classes on this issue. 
They were intensely against increasing the purge operation; their ranks 
. 93 
had the most to lose from such a program. 
The realization of the second goal sought by Parri fared little 
better than did that for the first, and for quite similar reasons. In 
his effort to achieve structural reform of the society, Parri was intent 
on checking the power exercised by oligopolies. He hoped to reorganize 
industry along more just lines than it had been organized in the past; 
in his scheme the smaller and medium-sized corporations would have more 
and better opportunities aimed at achieving a sense of balance in the 
industrial sphere. The specific plan by which Parri meant to bring his 
shake-up about was two pronged: first, it provided for a new income 
tax which was designed to strike out at the major industrial alliances 
which had reaped large profits while playing the game during the Fascist 
regime. Second, the plan created a system of distribution of the then 
very scarce, much needed raw materials which overtly favored small and 
93 Mammarella, pp. 100-101. 
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medium-sized businesses over the large ones. As in his efforts to 
accomplish his first goal, Parri was met with staunch resistance from 
the right. The Liberals reacted openly in criticism for the same reasons 
they had criticised the other ideas of Parri. They were conunitted to 
maintaining the traditional power structure of Italian society which had 
been fact since the Risorgimento, and they knew that Parri's political 
direction was the tool for the destruction of their power base. In their 
attacks against Parri, the Liberals gained a wide range of support from 
different public elements, not because they stood to lose in the same 
way, but because they viewed the second goal of the Parri plan as a means 
of attacking private property. 94 
The really long-range political ramifications which resulted from 
the conflict in the Parri government, however, was the sharp line being 
etched between left and right. Because the leftist parties openly supported 
Parri's program, Parri, who aimed at restructuring society socially and 
economically with parity as the foundations, was "accused of complicity 
with the Communists and of favoring their plans for gaining control of the 
95 
economic life of the country." Fuel was added to leftist versus 
rightist fire by the continually inflamatory institutional question. 
Parri and the republicans wanted to arrange national elections as soon 
as possible; they felt that the time was favorable for a republican win, 
and they wished to exploit this situation. The monarchists--the Liberals 
and certain Christian Democratic elements--on the other hand wished to 
delay the elections. They, of course, felt that they had everything 
to gain by waiting for a more strategic electoral opportunity. 
94 Mammarella, p. 101. 
95 Mammarella, p. 101. 
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The "ill-starred government" of Parri was doomed to early failure. 
Crisis-ridden, it was taut with tension. Finally, in November, 1945, 
the Liberals precipitated a ~risis which, added to the others~ drove Parri 
to resignation. The subject this time concerned the purge. As was 
pointed out earlier, Togliatti had been appointed Minister of Justice 
in the Parri cabinet. A common practice of 11defascistization" under his 
administration was imprisonment without tria1. 96 The Liberals chose to 
make an issue of this, and in November they demanded that this arbitrary 
action be curbed and required further that to accomplish this Parri 
should draft into his cabinet some older statesman who had no ties with 
the CLN and who opposed the purge to the extent it was currently being 
enacted. When Parri refused to take action on their demands, the Liberal 
ministers resigned. "Though De Gasperi piously called for continuation 
of the CLN hexarchy, he knew well that the PLI would not change its mind. 
Soon he associated the DC with the PLI boycotters of Parri. 1197 With the 
Christian Democrats' support of the Liberals and their resignation, 
Parri could no longer hope to survive. On November 24, 1945 he resigne d. 
The fact that the actions of the Liberals and the Christian 
Democrats caused the fall of Parri is without contention, but it is 
misleading to end with blame only directed toward them. The villains 
of the piece have not been identified in total. Norman Kogan maintains 
that "The Communists helped the Christian Democrats undermine the Parri 
government , the only one in postwar Italy really serious about social 
progress. 1198 This is probably true, as astonishing as it may be (for 
96Hi lton-Young, p. 183. 
97 Delzell, p. 566. 
98 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 184. 
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there is inherent contradiction without Mr. Kogan's thought). It is 
correct, for instance, that throughout the crises that occurred during 
the Parri five month government, the leftists, including the Communists, 
openly supported Parri's plan for change in postwar Italian society. 
To demonstrate their antipathy towards the slowness with -which the 
purge was being carried out, the Communists organized and led a series of 
riots. When Parri's fall was imminent, they activated the people into 
demonstrations against his loss. Nonetheless, the fact cannot be 
overlooked that although the PCI supported Parri and his Actionists 
on the surface of things, they did not support him vigorously. The real 
intent of Togliatti and the PCI was once again, as in the previous 
governments, to retain at all costs the positions in the government that 
they had thus far gained. 
Togliatti and the PCI were very much aware of what they were 
doing and what consequences would probably be precipitated by their 
actions. Togliatti's motivation during the Parri government was 
engineered in one direction: treading softly in an effort to gain poli-
tical footholds wherever he was able. With concern chiefly for the sur-
vivability of the PCI in government--letting by-product consequences 
fall as they might--he accomplished his goal in several ways. First, 
because he believed that an open revolution was not possible in Italy 
at that time--there were Anglo-American troops and no Red Army--he did 
not indulge in leftist, fiery impassioned speeches; instead behind the 
99 
scences he aimed at suppressing the fears of the conservative elements. 
Second, he utilized his energies to create a powerful workers' party by 
gaining and forging a strong position within the CGIL, the Italian 
99 Delzell, p. 563. 
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General Confederation of Labor, and organization which represented the 
resurrection of labor unions along pre-Fascist lines, and whose leadership 
was composed of the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists. 
Third, and most significant politically, Togliatti maneuvered to main-
tain, and thereby succeeded, a working relationship with Nenni and the 
PSIUP. The Unity of Action Pact first arrived at in 1934 as part of 
the Popular Front was renewed. Though this would result in the future 
subordination of the Socialist Party to the Communist Party, it was 
certainly short of fusion of the two parties, something which had come 
close to happening except for the efforts of Saragat and Silone, both 
moderates in the Socialist Party. The important point to be noted is 
that the renewal of the Unity of Action Pact signaled the demise of the 
Action Party. The Actionists and the revisionist element of the 
Socialist Party had envisioned a coalition between them. The renewal of 
coalition. With the Togliatti-Nenni Alliance, there was no "enduring 
place11 for the PdA; they had always been a very small party of intellect-
uals with little popular support, and now they had no place to go. 
History was repeating itself: just as Carlo Rosselli's 
Giustizia e Libert~ had been overtaken by the Social-Communist 
bloc in the era of the Popular Front and Spanish Civil War, 
[See Chapter II, The Communist Party in Italy 1921-1941] so 
Parri's Action Party was being outmaneuvered by Togliatti's 
brilliant tactics, the realities of Anglo-American power, and 
the mistakes of its won hotspurs.100 
In shedding even more light on this issue of the decline of the 
Action Party, one might consider the idea, put forth by Mammarella for 
one, that worked towards the downfall of Parri because it feared both 
him and the Action Party. This fear rested on the supposition that if 
his plan for change had been successful then the PdA might have become 
100 Delzell, pp. 564-565. 
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the moving force for the masses instead of the PCI. The Action Party, 
for the Communists, represented a "potentially dangerous competitor" who 
might be able to gain the allegiance of the people because of Parri's 
glorious leadership in the Resistance and because of his dauntless 
unwillingness to compromise. 
In the last analysis, the PCI was acutely aware of which way the 
political wind was blowing. They recognized the discontent in the conser-
vative upper and middle classes which had been generated by the ideas 
fostered in the Parri government. They knew that this discontent was 
the reason why the Christian Democrats had chosen to cease their support 
of Parri, and they reasoned that the swing back--towards the traditional 
vested interests--was going to continue for the foreseeable future. 
There was a progressive return to the old mental habits 
which were not openly Fascist any longer but paternalistic 
and authoritarian. Democracy was realized in the structures 
and the institutions but not in spirit; the fundamental freedoms 
were formally guaranteed but their meaning was partially negated 
by the favoring of vested interests.101 
With this awareness present, Togli&tti, "one of the shrewdest politicians 
of the century," chose to "blow" as harmoniously as possible with the 
wind. The PCI's survivability as a viable member of the government 
depended on this move. 
lOlMammarella, p. 103. 
CHAPTER V 
THE PCI AND THE RESISTANCE SEPTEMBER, 1943-MAY, 1945: 
A TIME FOR AGGRESSION 
I. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 
September 8, 1943, marked the birth of the Resistenza Armata 
in the half of Italy under the German heel. The void left in 
Rome and the North by the fugitive royal-military government 
and the disintegrating Italian armies in the face of ruthless 
German attack, followed by the shocking news of Mussolini's 
rescue, helped induce thousands of Italian patriots to join the 
partisan movement. This struggle, undertaken against heavy 
odds, climaxed two decades of clandestine opposition to Fascism 
and in no small degree helped to redeem Italy's all-but-
shattered moral and military reputation.l 
During the period when the Italian Peninsula was divided in two, the 
people who lived in the South and the people who inhabited the North 
and Central portions lived two quite different experiences. In the 
South, the Italians had been liberated from the Fascists and the Germans; 
in practice they were free and could go about their business. Technically, 
they were subjects of the Allies and as such were "scorned, misunderstood, 
.. 2 Th and suffering from every kind of shortage and privation... e war 
was over for the southerners; yet, the period of almost two years 
which followed the landing of the Anglo-American troops was one in which 
they felt little self-esteem and certainly not much a part of their 
1charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies The Italian Anti-
Fascist Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 261. 
2 H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, 1953), 
p. 137. 
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destinies. For those Italians who lived on the other side of the 
battle lines, particularly in the North, the post armistice period was 
quite another experience. In their arena, whether they chose it or 
not, a war was raging, and it was a war not only against an invader 
but also against fellow Italians. 
Though it is probably accurate that a good many of the people 
were passive and apathetic, nonetheless a large number of per sons, 
"a considerable minority which consciously and positively refused to 
3 
accept Mussolini's doctrines," worked actively towards liberating them-
selves from their oppressors. As was true of movements elsewhere in 
Europe, the Resistance movement in Italy was comprised of many different 
elements. There were workers and industrialists who lowered their 
rate of production in an effort to hurt German war production. Many public 
officials refused to obey German orders and secretly gave aid to anti-
German fighters. Some simply went into hiding rather than work for the 
Germans. Peasants were yet another element who aided in the Resistance; 
many would not supply farm products to the enemy, and whenever they 
were able they hid prisoners of war or partisans. Finally there were 
the armed guerrillas and saboteurs themselves who formed the backbone of 
the Resistance. 4 These elements of the population at one time or another 
gave help, each in its own specific way, towards driving the enemy 
out of Italy. 
3Massimo Salvadori-Paleotti, "The Patriot Movement in Italy," 
Foreign Affairs, April, 1946, p. 539. 
4 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 539. 
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The Italian Resistance was composed of two major elements. One 
. 5 
was political and the other military. The former was comprised of 
local Committees of National Liberation (CLNs). These CLNs were 
clandestine counterparts to the Central CLN in Rome which had evolved 
6 from Ivanoe Bonomi's Anti-Fascist Committee formed on 9 September, 1943. 
During the latter part of 1943 and in 1944, northern and central area 
CLNs were formed in every regional capital, in most of the provincial 
capitals, and in many of the towns and villages. 7 Usually they were, 
like the Central CLN, composed of representatives from the major political 
parties. 8 Milan's underground organization met soon after the armistice 
was announced on September 8, and at this meeting it decided to follow 
in the footsteps of the CCLN by transforming itself into a CLN. Because 
of its competent leadership and its strategic location, the Milan CLN 
developed into the most important Committee for the North. 9 In fact 
it later created the CLN dell'Alta Italia (CLNAI) which communicated 
5 Muriel Grindrod, The New Italy Transition From War to Peace 
(London, 1947), p. 16. 
6 See Chapter IV, "The PCI and Politics," the section on the CLNs. 
7
salvadori-Paleotti, p. 541. 
8 
See Chapter IV, "The PCI and Politics," keeping in mind that in 
the South the CLNs had representatives from six political parties while 
in the North they were comprised of representatives from five major 
parties. The Labor Democrats were not represented in the Northern CLNs. 
Also Salvadore-Paleotti indicates that "sometimes only three or 
four of the major anti-Fascist parties were represented [in the North]; 
sometimes the committees included smaller organizations which had 
local political significance, such as Italian Republicans, Social 
Christians and Anarcho-Syndicalis ts." (Salvadore-Paleotti, p. 541.) 
9 Delzell, p. 278. 
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with Allied Force Headquarters and for all practical purposes controlled 
both the political and military Resistance in the North.lo The CLNAI 
11 
"had more or less parallel status with the Rome CCLN." In the city of 
Turin the Comitato Piemontese di Liberazione Nazionale (CPLN) evolved 
from the Committee of the Opposition, the underground organization which 
had existed there from early 1943. Like its sister CLNs in the North, 
the Torinese group functioned in virtual secrecy. Its members were very 
careful about outsiders, and they moved their meeting places continuously. 
Gatherings out of doors preferably were restricted to two or 
three persons and were confined usually to outlying streets. 
While walking, the conspirators might exchange a few important 
documents, though a basic rule was to keep written material at 
a minimum and in code whenever feasible.12 
In Florence the Comitato Toscano di Liberazione Nazionale (CTLN) also 
was born from an earlier underground organ. In 1943. and 1944, then, 
all over the North, in Genoa, Bologna, Padua, Trent, and Trieste, in the 
wake of Milan and Turin and Florence, more Comitati were "mushrooming". 
The CLNs were extremely imporant to the total Resistance movement. 
They were the lifeline of the military segment; everywhere they were 
13 
organized as "centers for communication, supply, and political propaganda." 
10 Grindrod, The New Italy, p. 16. 
11 
Delzell, p. 278. 
12 Delzell, p. 279. 
13 Hughes, p. 139. Elizabeth Wiskemann also adds, as another major 
task of the CLNs in the cities, the sabotage of industrial production. 
Both industrialists and workmen were willing to carry this out. Enrico 
Falck of the Falck steel works in Milan worked with his own men to 
decrease production to the minimum. Factory workers in Milan and Turin 
"excelled in short sit-down strikes on some plausible economic pretext." 
And of course there were the big strikes of 1943 and 1944. (Elizabeth 
Wiskemann, "The Italian Resistance Movements," Survey of International 
Affairs, 1939-1946, ed. Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, Vol.: Hitler's 
Europe (London, 1954), p. 329. 
78 
The Resistance fighters, those actually in the field carrying on 
guerrilla warfare and sabotage against the Germans and the Fascists, 
soon realized how important their function was. The number of men who 
could be fed and clothed and maintained in any valley was limited. 
"The peasants were usually willing to share what food they had, but 
14 
not to the point of starving themselves." In order to meet the extreme 
need for food and arms and money, the leaders of Resistance groups 
which were living in the mountains appealed to and relied upon the CLNs 
in the local towns and villages to supply their requirements. "Thus they 
were brought to accept, at least partly, the authority of the under-
ground centralized organizations. 1115 
The second major division of the Resistance was the military 
branch. This was the armed segment of the movement, and its members 
were called partisans or patriots. Though in recent years Italy had 
had really no established precedent for revolutionary or guerrilla 
warfare, there were and had been forces existent within the peninsula 
which accounted for the rise of the militancy exhibited during the 
twenty months of German-Fascist occupation. First, many Italians 
with leftist political affiliations, from the PCI, the PSIUP, and the 
PdA, had gained first hand experience in guerrilla tactics during the 
16 Spanish Civil War. These same men and others knew of and followed the 
movements of the Resistance in France, Yugoslavia and eastern Europe. 
14 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542. 
15 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542. 
16
see Chapter II, "The Communist Party in Italy," the section 
concerning the Togliatti leadership from abroad. 
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With this background the leaders in the Italian movement began to set 
the stage for the fighting in the occupied areas. Togliatti, even 
before returning to Italy in March, 1944, had broadcast from Moscow to 
his fellow Italians that they must be strong in the forthcoming underground 
fight. The Communists of Rome and the Actionists of Florence had both 
"anticipated the task" of preparing for the armed underground struggle, 
and both had set "precise military plans" into motion well before the 
actual fighting had begun. 17 A second reason, and one worth mentioning, 
which possibly accounts for the rapid rise of the partisan movement in 
northern Italy is the fact that in Italy which was the poorest country 
in Europe with the lowest standard of living for the masses of people, 
industry was located mainly in the North, "and in the northern cities 
were the most active democratic movement and the strongest trade unionism 
before the advent of Fascism. 1118 The heritage of Socialism and Communism 
cannot be overlooked when considering the strikes and the sabotage to 
industrial production which took place in northern cities as part of the 
Resistenza Armata. 
The greatest number of partisans lived and fought from the 
mountains, either those that bordered the Po valley or the Apennines 
located in central Italy. 19 The reasons for their mountainous existence 
17 Delzell, p. 286. 
18 Lord Strabolgi, The Conquest of Italy (London, 1944), p. 65. 
19 Delzell, p. 285. The partisans who operated from towns were 
not as numerous as those existing in the mountains and hills~ They 
were, however, in the beginning better organized and "had a more 
definite political character." (Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 540.) 
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deal, of course, with tactics. They had to be in range of the enemy, 
and concomitantly able to reach land which was either forested or 
mountainous so that they could hide from him. Also, as was hinted at 
above, partisans tended to gather in locations where they could quickly 
add to their numbers, that is near towns and cities. Added to these 
considerations, they had to be ever concerned about refurbishing their 
food and clothing supply and their arms supply; consequently, "logistics 
restricted their range of operations to zones where supplies might readily 
be acquired. 1120 Thus, they could not be too far from towns as well as 
from farm areas because they needed to eat, and warmth during the winter 
was essential. They had to be prepared to make strategic raids on supply 
depots or outposts in order to ensure possession of enough weaponry to 
continue fighting. 
The basic unit in the partisan organization was a detachment which 
contained about fifty men. This detachment was further divided into 
three or four squads. Detachments of fifty men comprised a battalion, 
and three battalions formed a brigade, with an average concentration of 
about 450 men. In actuality, the numbers in a brigade were anywhere 
from 250 to 600 men. Finally, three brigades equalled a division. In 
each detachment battalion, brigade and division the chief leaders were 
the commander and the political connnissar. 21 
As. the Resistance movement was compose~ of two major divisions, 
the political and the military, so the military division was further 
broken down into yet two other chief branches. There were many men 
who had served in the Italian Army who chose to join partisan bands. 
20 
Delzell, p. 285. 
21 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542. 
These men who came from disbanded army groupings came to be known as 
P,.utonomi because they formed "autonomous" patriot groups which claimed 
to be without political bias towards any of the political parties, 
including those major ones represented in the CLNs. 22 They eschewed 
any and all political questions, making it clear that such questions 
23 
should be settled only when the struggle at hand was ended. 
The second major branch of the military Resistance was formed 
by the political partisan bands. These bands differed from the Auto-
81 
nomi in that they did not eschew political allegiance; in fact, they were 
closely connected to political parties, their leadership usually drawn 
24 
from party activists. The political partisans were more numerous than 
the Autonomi, and the three Leftist parties formed more ba~ds than did 
the other political parties. 
A careful Allied liaison officer and investigator has estimated 
that in the North (including upper Tuscany) political bands 
accounted for three fourth of the guerrillas, and in central 
Italy about two-thirds.25 
The PCI had the best organized and the greatest number of partisan 
bands. These bands were called the Garibaldini, and they made up from 
26 fifty to fifty-five per cent of the whole partisan army. They were 
22They were also called "badogliani", a derisive term describing 
them as persons who had collaborated with Marshal Badoglio in the period 
of the "forty-five days." 
23 
Delzell, p. 287. 
24 Giuseppe Mammarella, Italy After Fascism A Political History 
1943- 1965 (Notre Dame, 1966), p. 81. 
25 
Delzell, p. 290. 
26 Mammarella, p. 81. 
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most efficiently organized, and though by far not all the members of 
their ranks were Communists, it was an absolute must that the leadership 
27 in the groups always be from the Communist cadres. 
The second most numerous units after those controlled by the 
Communists were the forces under the leadership of the Action Party. 
Their bands known as the Giustizia e Liberta and the Rosselli brigades 
28 probably made up about one fourth the entire number of political bands. 
The Actionist leadership had a deep sense of commitment and provided 
considerable competition to the Communists in terms of this commitment, 
29 
and also in the publication of and spreading of propaganda. 
Though on a smaller basis, other political parties also formed 
groups of partisans to fight in the Armed Resistance. The Christian 
Democrats and the Liberals, preferring to lend their support to Autonomi 
who already existed, entered into the scene relatively late. Only in 
1944, and again in 1945, did the Christian Democrats initiate their own 
partisan groups; the Liberals did likewise. The Socialists eventually 
created the Matteotti brigades which operated mainly in the uplands of 
Lombard and Piedmont. Finally, there were a few local, small parties 
which sporadically created fighting groups in sundry locations or 
joined with one or another of those groups sponsored by the main 
. 30 parties. 
27 Delzell, 290. p. 
28 
Delzell, p. 292. 
29 
Delzell, 292. p. 
30 
Delzell, pp. 294-295. 
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During the first winter of the Resistance, 1943-1944, the two 
major groupings of the Armed Resistance, the members of tbe political 
bands and the Autonomi or Badogliani as they were called, were, in a 
sense, at odds with each other. At this point in time the CLNs had 
not yet joined the Badoglio government, and this caused much internal 
tension. After April, 1944 when a new cabinet had been formed by Badoglio 
which did include representatives from the major political parties, 
tension was decreased among the partisans. 31 This is important because 
the acceptance of Marshal Badoglio as Prime Minister by the Central 
CLN "laid the foundations for cooperation among the various elements of 
the Patriot movement. 1132 
The Italian Resistance movement, then, was a national movement 
and a popular uprising. It was national in character because it was 
nourished by an anti-German sentiment the roots of which reached back 
to the Risorgimento and the First World War. It was a popular movement 
in that individuals from all social strata became at one time or another 
involved in it. The Church, the army, the middle classes, the upper 
classes, the working classes in the cities, and the peasants in the 
countryside all contributed in their own fashion to the success of 
33 
struggle against the Germans and the Fascists. 
The motives which led such various and different types of people 
to partake in the same fight are, to say the least, interesting to 
31 See Chapter IV, "The PCI and Politics," the section on the 
Badoglio governments. 
32 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542. 
33
shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino, A History of Modern 
Italy Documents, Readings, and Counnentary (New York, 1968), p. 526. 
contemplate. Perhaps the statement that these motives were "a mixture 
of patriotic, ideological, idealistic reasons, intertwined with self-
interest" is the most accurate that can be offered. 34 For many of the 
ex-Army men who joined the Armed Resistance, cormnitment was based on 
feelings of patriotism and idealism. These men felt a deep sense of 
loyalty to the oath they had sworn in allegiance to their King. In 
their minds Victor Emmanuel continued to stand for the Italian state; 
84 
in fact, he was the only man who legally had the right to lead the country. 
These ex-soldiers, in point of fact, viewed themselves as the legal 
representatives of the King and the Italian government; they were 
intent upon loyalty to their oath and were prepared to fight to this 
35 
end. 
Certainly ideological reasons for fighting in the Resistance 
were also prevalent. These were found chiefly among the ranks of the 
political partisans, as opposed to the Autonomi. Though the bulk of the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberals viewed the Armed Resistance basically 
as a means to rid the country of the Germans and the Fascists, the 
Leftist parties saw the entire movement as vastly more important than 
merely ending the war as swiftly as possible. Most of them believed 
passionately that the underground "also represented the armed force of 
a revolutionary movement which was to reshape the political and social 
structure of the country at the end of the war. 1136 They trusted in the 
idea that the Resistance would be the springboard from which change in 
34 
Delzell, p. 286. 
35 Clough, Saladino, pp. 527-528. 
36 Mannnarella, p. 81. 
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Italian society would begin. The old traditional elements so strongly 
woven into the society would be rooted out, and the working classes 
would refashion the state along lines fair and jus.t for the people. 
Also ideologically, there were those who took part in the Resistance 
because they thought of Fascism as nothing but Evil personified. A 
certain set of situations and circumstances had allowed this "Evil" 
to beset Italian life, but once it was cut out of the body of the 
state all would be well. As Croce had dictated it was like a tumor 
that "would never return. 1137 
Idealistic motivation was not absent from the ranks of the 
Resistance . 
..• the historian cannot deny the presence of a substantial 
measure of tough-fibered idealism and discipline among the 
underground fighters if he is to explain satisfactorily the 
readiness of the hard core of volunteers to face up month 
after month to the handicaps of that kind of warfare and the 
cruel tortures, if not death itself, that almost certainly 
became their lot when captured.38 
There is considerable evidence to support the existence of this !audible 
idealism. Many of the partisans were captured by the Germans and then 
were sentenced to die; "last letters" from many of these men attest to 
the fact that they sincerely and passionately believed in what they had 
fought for and were, indeed, willing to die for the same cause. The tone 
of these letters reveals "a sense of political vision and of calm, and 
1 f i d 1139 mora ort tu e ... No better example of this can be offered than to 
quote a line from a letter of Duccio Galimberti (affiliated with the 
37 Saladino, 527. Clough, p. 
38 
Delzell, p. 289. 
39 
Delzell, p. 289. 
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Action Party) written to his family after he has been condemned to death 
as a prisoner of war: "I acted with good intentions for an ideal: fo r 
this I am serene, and so must you also be. 1140 
Finally, there were those who entered the ranks of the Resistance 
with self-preservation as their primary motive. They went into the 
Resistance in an effort to escape being recruited by the Germans for 
labor in Germany as quasi-prisoners of war or by the Fascists for military 
service against their own people. They reasoned that it was better to 
escape from a pressing and sure problem, while hoping that the war 
would somehow come to a speedy conclusion. And, of course, there was 
that minority of individuals who figured that sooner or later membership 
in the Resistance rank and file would provide "indispensable credentials" 
in the future rebuilding of the state. 41 Whatever the motives were for 
those who participated in the Resistance, and seemingly they were 
varied, the movement itself worked; it had its glory and it was 
successful. Perhaps it is enough to conclude this section concerning 
the motivation on the part of those who involved themselve~ in the 
Resistance by repeating the sentiment of Paolo Treves which he expressed 
in June, 1944: 
Many figures have been put forth about the strength of the 
patriots' ranks, and it seems that the most conservative 
estimates reckon with 300,000 men. Obviously not every single 
man in the patriot formations is a politically minded anti-
Fascist. That cannot be so, but it is, I submit, permissible 
to say that the Iecovery of Italy will be very largely the work 
of her own sons. 2 
40 Delzell, p. 289. 
41 Clough, Saladino, p. 528. 
42 Paolo Treves, "The Underground in Italy," International Postwar 
Problems, June, 1944, p. 421. 
The Armed Resistance took place chiefly in the northern and 
central portions of Italy. No partisans organized themselves in Sicily 
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or in Sardinia; this was due in part because the Allies landed there first. 
but it was also attributed to the dearth of political and social awareness 
endemic to the islands' populations. An identical lack of consciousness 
was to be found in most of southern Italy. with the exception of the city 
of Naples. 43 In that city in the fall of 1943 there occurred a small 
spontaneous rebellion against the Germans which perhaps provided the 
one creditable southern contribution to the Armed Resistance. The 
quattro giornate (the four glorious days. as the rebellion came to be 
called) happened during the four days between September 27 and 30. 1943. 
Shortly after Marshal Badoglio had made public the armistice 
between the Allies and his government, the Germans with little resistance 
took over the city of Naples. There was a committee of anti-Fascist 
parties active in the city, but they seemed unable to rally the citizens 
against the enemy. Nonetheless as time passed, hostility built up 
between the population and the Germans who were anything but kind 
overseers. 44 In addition to their problems with the interloper, the 
inhabitants of the port city suffered both from food and water shortages 
and from continuous Allied aerial bombardments. Under these potentially 
explosive circumstances violence finally materialized. On the 27th of 
September the Germans shot five persons and imprisoned fifty more as a 
reprisal for the killing of one of their motorcyclists. The Italians--
mainly some very young persons from the lower classes--decided to fight 
43 
Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542. 
44 
Delzell, p. 283. 
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45 back, and their revolt spread rather quickly. Their insurrection 
continued for four days, though there was apparently no specific 
organization or goal on the part of the rioters. 
The quattro giornate was not representative of the partisan 
warfare of the Armed Resistance; " .•. it attained neither the degree of 
political purpose nor mass support that characterized the struggle in the 
46 
North." But though it was not fighting that emulated the caliber of 
that executed in the North, it did make a contribution to the Resistance 
movement. Those Neapolitans who took part in the quattro giornate 
"unwittingly" showed their fellow countrymen that the Germans (with the 
threat of imminent Allied help} could be defeated by the Italians and 
their own efforts. "It is possible that the rioting .•. was one of the 
47 factors which induced the Nazies to abandon the city." The Neapolitan 
rebellion, then, provided the Northern partisans with an example worth 
imitating. 
In central Italy resistance activity, though it was only moderately 
extensive, was more clearly evident than in the South. During the time 
period between October, 1943 and June, 1944 when the Allies began their 
drive to liberate the remaining part of the peninsula from Rome northward, 
the Resistance movement in central Italy took form and as it developed 
caused serious problems for the Germans and the Fascist Social Republic. 
It has been estimated that there were 8,000 members of the underground 
in Rome itself; whether because of conflict or for other reasons, however, 
45 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542. 
46 Delzell, p. 283. 
47 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542. 
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the efforts of this Roman contingenct were poorly coordinated and a~ounted 
1 . 1 48 to itt e. There were large groups of partisans located in central 
I taly, and they were found chiefly in the main range of the Apennines; 
just to the ~ast of this main range there were also present fairly 
large bands of guerrillas, though they were not as concentrated as the 
former. In the sparsely inhabited areas of the Lazio, northern Abruzzi, 
49 
and southern Tuscany smaller partisan bands existed. 
It was in the northern sector of central Italy, in such areas as 
Tuscany and Romagna, that the real strength of the central segment of the 
Armed Resistance demonstrated itself. In these areas the partisans were 
more numerous, more active, and better prepared. 
They operated all along the main range of the Apennines and 
also in the secondary mountainous regions: Alpe di Catenaia 
and Casentino, southeast and east of Florence; Pratomagno, 
Mugello and Monte Pisano a little further north. Some bands, 
although very small, led an independent existence. Others were 
grouped, making up as many as 2,000 Patriots.SO 
Finally, the city of Florence and the partisan effort demonstrated there 
provided the Resistance in central Italy with its apogee. Before the 
Allies had entered the Tuscan city in August, 1944, the part~sans there 
had already liberated an entire quarter; they went on to help the 
51 
British and the Americans take the remainder of the city. 
The best partisan bands of the Armed Resistance, in terms of 
organization, discipline, and effectiveness, were in the North. It was 
48 
Hughes, p. 139. 
49 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 543. 
50
salvadori-Paleotti, p. 544. 
51 Hughes, p. 139. 
in this area, in the mountains of Piedmont and Lombardy, that armed 
guerrillas had first emerged. Shortly after, other partisans fanned 
out over the northern landscape, clandestinely surfacing in Emilia, 
Liguria, and the mountains of the Veneto. Some of the finest northern 
Italian partisan groups, mostly Garibaldini, occupied the mountains in 
Modena and Reggio. These groups were well-supplied by the Allies with 
arms and ammunition, and they posed an effective threat to the Germans . 
Finally, in the Lombard-Emilian Apennines, particularly, there were 
partisans west of Piacenza and southwest of Pavia and elsewhere in 
Lombardy and at least until September, 1944, many survived in valleys 
52 
east of Lake Como. As far as the citi es and towns of northern Italy 
we re concerned, they sheltered fewer partisans than did the mountains. 
Turin had probably the largest percentage of Patriots relative 
to its population, and they were the best organized. Second came 
the industrial area of greater Genoa, with Bologna third. The 
Resistance movement in Milan, Venice and Trieste could rely on 
a certain number of Patriots, though the number in these cities 
was not large considering their size. Patriot groups were 
found in some smaller towns, although their activities were 
limited.53 . 
II. THE ROLE OF THE PCI IN THE RESISTANCE 
90 
The Communists who participated in the Resistance were idealistic, 
disciplined, and connnitted to what they believed the movement stood for. 
Giaime Pintor was a young poet and a member of the Connnunist Party. 
His decision to join the ranks of the Armed Resistance epitomizes the 
idealism which prompted many of the leftist oriented partisans to leave 
their homes and take to the mountains. These Resistance soldiers 
52 Salvadori-Paleotti, pp. 544-545. 
53 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 545. 
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looked upon the fight to drive the Germans and the Fascists from Italy 
as another Risorgimento. Pintor's decision, as the decision of others, 
was fired by the zealous ideal of lib.erty and justice for all classes 
of society; they were no longer willing to accept the status quo of the 
rigidly ordered, traditionalist Italian society. In the words of Pintor: 
Today the possibilities of the Risorgimento are reopened for 
the Italians: no gesture is useless provided it does not 
become an end in itself. As for me, I assure you that the idea 
of going to be a partisan in this season gives me very little 
pleasure; I have never appreciated as now the comforts of 
civilized life and I feel sure that I would become an excellent 
translator and a good diplomat, but according to every likeli-
hood a mediocre partisan. Nevertheless, it is the only 
possibility open and I accept it.54 
The party activists who organized and led the Garibaldini were 
highly disciplined in their attitude, as well as idealistic. They were 
obedient and dedicated to the Party; in fact their allegiance was 
fervent, almost religious in character. They established an attitude 
in their bands in which all was subordinated to the cause of the 
Resistance. No one expected any privileges. If anyone were even 
offered a plate of spaghetti by a peasant, the food was refused. 1bere 
were even the "saints, 11 those who suffered quietly and gladly. There 
was one man who preferred to sleep on the ground rather than in a 
bed in order to be "closer to humility;" there was also a man who had 
55 
sold his teeth so he could give some money to his family. The tone 
set by the party leadership for their partisan bands was one inherently 
54 Delzell, p. 289. 
55Giorgio Bacca, Storia Dell'Italia Partigiana (Bari, 1966), p. 99. 
Bacca ends his paragraph with this statement: "Un grande partito una 
grande rivoluzione che ha cambiato la faccia del mondo, ma i bigotti 
restano bigotti, il fanatismo fanatismo e la religione puo degradare 
a superstizione." His view of the Communists is a sardonic one. 
(Bacca, p. 99.) 
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disciplined. These leaders were men who had already proved their 
toughness and their commitment to the Party and to the struggle; their 
dedication was predicated on having spent time in prison for their belie fs 
and/or having fought in the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil 
War. 
The most important description of the role played by the Conununists 
in the Resistance is that dealing with their commitment. Unlike the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberals who viewed participation in the 
Resistance only for the purpose of ridding the country of the undesirable 
opponents, the PCI considered the participation dual in purpose. The 
first goal for them was the obvious one, and the one they shared with the 
non-leftist parties. The second aim of the PCI was the more long range 
of the two; for the Connnunists "the Resistance was not only a national 
and patriotic force organized to oust the Germans from the country, but 
also represented ••. a movement which was to reshape the political and 
social structure of the country .•. 1156 The performance of the Communists 
in carrying out their first goal receives a high mark; they were extremely 
effective in their organizational abilities and as l~aders, not only 
in the Garibaldini, but as an example to all the other partisan bands, 
Autonomi and political. In evaluating the success of their second goal, 
perhaps the most accurate statement is that their attempt was an astute 
one. This evaluation is important, because though they did not succeed 
in bringing about the change that they desired, during the Resistance 
period they were continuously aware of the forces working for them and 
against them, and they constantly attempted to manipulate these forces 
56 Mammarella, p. 81. 
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to their advantage. Because of this awareness and this aggressiveness, 
their endeavors, historically, cannot be taken lightly. 
The most meaningful experience in the formation of a leadership 
cadre in the Italian Communist Party was their long period of 
clandestine activity and the Resistance movement they directed 
against the Germans.57 
The Communists were indeed the leaders and the organizers in the 
Resistance. There is much evidence to support the contention that they 
provided a model for other underground groups. Early in the winter of 
. 58 
1944 the Communists introduced the concept of the political commissar. 
The Garibaldini had one commissar for about every fifty men. The chief 
task of this man was to inculcate discipline in his grouping. He 
achieved this by setting aside a certain number of hours each day, or 
almost every day, during which discussions and lectures of a political 
nature were held. An example of the conunissar's discipline system is 
reflected in instructions handed down in 1944: 
Wherever Communists find themselves--in factories, villages, 
offices, partisan formations--they have the duty to organize 
themselves and carry on activity. In the absence of this, they 
cease for practical purpose to function in the party. There is 
weakness and lack of discipline wherever Communists are not 
present, and the Communists are an element of force only if they 
are organized.59 
Further, the commissar was responsible for coordinating PCI work 
between his partisan group and the Party. He had to supervise one 
57sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven, 
1967), p. 227. 
58The employment of political commissars was not a new idea. 
The Communists had used commissars at different times in the Russian 
Red Army, the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War, and the 
Balkan partisan movements. 
59 Delzell, p. 349. 
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person from his band who would report to the "federal committee" (of 
the Party) in each province. The "federal committee" coordinated the 
functioning of all the cells in the partisan bands which existed in its 
province. If cells were non-existent where they should be present, 
60 the commissar was responsible for their immediate formation. 
The Conununists were most serious about the organizational quality 
of their partisan bands, and in introducing the office of the political 
commissar they provided the tight discipline and excellent coordination 
that was needed. The salient point is that they saw the need, and they 
provided the solution through their leadership. It was not long before 
many of the other partisan groups (political partisans) followed their 
lead, though it was "with some reluctance, and perhaps in self-defense, 
61 that certain other formations also adopted the system." There were, 
in fact, strong rivalries among the political partisans. It is important 
to note, also, that when other groups did finally copy the commissar idea 
of organization within their partisan formations, the evershrewd Communists 
did their utmost to place their men in these strategic positions. 
Both the Communists and the Actionists shared the spotlight when 
it crune to advertising the glorious ideals of the Resistance. Both 
entered the Resistance with backgrounds rich in the experience of publish-
ing in the clandestine press. They had, unlike the other Italian political 
parties, operated in the underground movement against Mussolini almost 
from the beginning. Though many of the partisan groups produced newspapers, 
pamphlets, poems, bulletins, and the like, gradually the PCI emerged as 
60 Delzell, pp. 348-349. 
61 Delzell, p. 348. 
a leader of this movement within a movement. Early in the Resistance 
the PCI, along with the PdA, published more material than any group. 62 
They put out regularly an underground paper in Rome and in Milan, and 
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they also produced periodicals for the partisan bands on a regular basis. 
The main purpose for the publications was to maintain the morale of the 
Resistance and to make known its ideals. PC! political theory and infor-
63 
mation was expounded in its La nostra lotta and L'Unita. 
As the Resistance movement progressed, the Supreme Headquarters of 
the Resistance "issued a decree" calling upon all those fighting in the 
movement to turn out propaganda literature. The Supreme Headquarters 
of the Resistance was part of the CLNAI, and the CLNAI was dominated 
by the leftist parties, particularly the Communist Party. Thus, this 
decree was in effect issued by the PCI; by the middle of September, 1944, 
when the edict was given, the Communists had indeed assumed a posture of 
leadership concerning the operations of the clandestine press. The decree 
also included further instructions, not surprisingly along the organizational 
lines introduced by the Communists. Political commissars were suggested 
as those persons who should organize and supervise the writing of the 
material for publication. More than one person should contribute to the 
writing. "Articles should take up topics of local interest, and be 
educative and critical of concrete things--'concepts of discipline, 
democracy, brotherhood toward other formations and the people. 11164 
62The Actionist L'Italia Libera had a circulation of 20,000; the 
L'Unita, 30,000; the Socialist Avanti!, 15,000; the Liberal Risorgimento 
Liberale, 10,000; the Christian Democrat Il Popolo, 10,000. (Bacca, p. 
267.) 
63 Delzell, pp. 351-352. 
64nelzell, p 351. 
Finally, the decree suggested that political commissars learn the art 
65 
of bulletin board use. 
The Communists realized the value of continuously harassing the 
enemy. This meant that fighting, and fighting whenever possible, was 
a necessity. The Communists hated the concept of attesismo ("watchful 
waiting"). 66 This posture of caution was anathma to them; the only way 
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to win was to be aggressive and to push for "all-out fighting." As their 
organizational and leadership qualities had come to .the fore before, once 
again it surfaced in the Communist created Gappisti and later the 
Sappisti. The Gappisti (GAP, Gruppi di Azione Popolare) were urban 
guerrilla units who used hit-and-run tactics to cause as much damage 
as possible whenever possible to the Germans and the Fascists. They were 
a counterpart to those men who lived in and fought from the mountains. 
They were first introduced by the Communists in early 1943, and as a 
tactic their value was proved as the Resistance progressed. A GAP 
group usually consisted of three or four boys in their teens who operated 
in the large industrial cities under the supervision of a PCI activist. 
They moved swiftly and secretly, hitting the enemy and running; they 
blew up command posts, assassinated Fascist leaders, and killed eRemy 
65 Delzell, p. 351. 
66 This was a policy adopted by "some right-wing anti-Fascists 
early in the partisan campaigns. Because it was often true that in 
direct military encounters the partisans were not successful against 
German artillery, these anti-Fascists advocated a more cautious policy, 
opposed to fighting. They encouraged attesismo or "watchful waiting" 
until the Allies' approach was imminent, in the hope of avoiding unnece-
ssary reprisals against civilians. Before very long, the Communists came 
to view this policy as one antithetic to their political goals; conse-
quently, they publically, through the press denounced attesismo and called 
for an all-out fight. 
sentries. They gloried in the art of surprise and the constant 
harrassment and erosion of the enemy forces. Though the Gappisti 
mortality rate was high--the risk was great--the PC! created and con-
tinued to utilize this tactic, as did other partisan groups. For the 
aggressive Communists, it was one more effective element in the fight 
against the Germans and Fascists; they felt "that the resul,tant danger 
of reprisals was worth the price if it imbued the city folk with the 
67 
spirit of recklessness necessary for a more successful insurection. 11 
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The Sappisti were yet another innovative and effective creation of 
the Communists. They first appeared in the Po Valley where their main 
task in fighting the enemy was to make sure that the harvest of grain 
did not fall into the hands of the Germans and Fascists. Their theatre 
was the valley and if they could not hide the grain, they destroyed it. 
Later in 1944 the PCI integrated the Sappisti and Gappisti forces so 
that both functioned within the urban areas. The Sappisti, however, 
were usually involved in the protection of factories from sabotage while 
68 
the Gappisti continued to be the urban attack force against the enemy. 
In conclusion, the Gappisti and the Sappisti were introduced by and 
sponsored by the PCI. Like the role of the political commissar, 
also introduced and expanded by the Party, they provided another "useful 
'capillary organ' of the underground." 
In addition to introducing organizational methods as well as 
tactical innovations, the PCI provided leadership among the factory 
workers in the industrial centers. Though the workers in the factories 
were not technically a part of the Resistance as it is defined in this 
67 Delzell, p. 304. 
68 Delzell, p. 419. 
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work, they were a large force to be reckoned with and to be utilized in 
the fight against the enemy. More importantly, to the PC!, they were 
the proletariat who would help effect the political, economic, and 
social change of Italian society in the postwar period. Partly to demon-
strate their potential political power, but also for the immediate value 
to the Resistance movement, the Cormnunist Party planned, through the 
CLNAI, and executed the widely based general strike of March, 1944 
69 (another general strike occurred in December of the same year). 
Through careful and secret planning the strike was executed; it began 
on March 1 when several thousand workers in the northern cities stopped 
work. The strike was more extensive in some cities than in others. In 
Milan and in Turin, to a slightly lesser degree, almost all production 
was halted for an entire week. In the city of Florence streetcar workers 
struck along side the factory workers; the city's newspaper was not 
printed for three days. In Bologna groups of peasants also demonstrated, 
and in Florence the Fascist headquarters ' was burned to the ground by 
roaming strikers. Finally, in such cities as Trieste, Genoa, and 
Biella, the strike never really materialized "partly because of prior 
wage boosts, fear, and hastily called 'preventive holidays' ascribed to 
70 
alleged 'electric' power shortages." 
In general the strike of March, 1944 was a success; in many of the 
cities due to the superior organization and planning skills of the 
Communists and to their aggressive ability to agitate, the operation 
71 involved masses of people and functioned smoothly. But its real success 
69 371. Delzell, p. 
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was that it accomplished two things that the PC! had argued it would 
accomplish, when they had initially introduced their strike plan to the 
CLNAI. First, the strike did succeed in slowing down war production 
for Germany; in some of the larger plants production was at a standstill 
72 for a week. Second, and more important to the Party's goals, the 
strike "signaled the onset of greater popular hostility td neo-Fascism" 
and it appeared to strengthen an attitude of working together to defeat 
73 the enemy. 
Though the Communists demonstrated that they were effective 
leaders, perhaps the leaders, in the Resistance movement, not all that 
can be written about them is entirely positive. There are those who 
judge that at times they were too aggressive, too rash and that by 
being so they caused more harm than good. Their actions which precipitated 
the infamous Ardeatine Cave massacre is one such incidence. In the early 
spring of 1944 the Gappisti stepped up their terroristic activities in 
several cities. In Rome in particular the Communists felt that the 
population was not doing enough to harass the enemy; the citizens 
seemed to be apathetic, waiting for the Allied troops to liberate them 
from the Germans. To combat this the Gappisti planned a new series of 
violent hit-and-run tactics intended to both damage the Germans and to 
stir up the Roman population. On the afternoon of March 23, a squad of 
GAP students executed an attack against a detachment of German security 
police. Every afternoon the police marched d~wn a certain street. The 
disguised students were present at their marching time; one of them 
72 See page 98. 
73 Delzell, p. 372. 
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posing as a street cleaner rolled a cart filled with explosives dire ctly 
into the marching soldiers, while at the same time his fellow Gappisti 
who were hidden began shooting at them. Thirty-three of the enemy 
were killed and many of the others were wounded. 
The Germans were furious and determined to take their revenge. 
After consultation with many of their leaders, including Hitler, they 
decided that they would kill ten Italians for every one German soldier 
who had died. 
The German Connnand has decided to put a stop to the activity 
of these villainous outlaws. No one ought to be able to 
sabotage with impunity the newly affirmed Italian-German 
collaboration. The German Comnand, thus, has ordered that for 
each German assassinated ten Communist and Bodoglio criminals 
will be shot. This order has already been executed.74 
In the end the number scheduled to die as indicated by the German 
Command was not accurate. 335 instead of 320 Italians were executed as 
a result of the GAP killing of German police. Also, not only Communists 
and Badogliani died; men from all parties were included in those who 
died as a result of the Germans' reprisal. The victims were chosen 
from the prison cells of Regina Coeli and police headquarters, Via 
Tasso (An Italian police official aided in the selection from the 
prisons), and also from the neighborhood where the GAP students had 
attacked and killed the Germans. On the night of March 24-25, the 
Italian reprisal victims were taken to a cave on the outskirts of Rome; 
there they were slaughtered. The Germans shot each of their victims in 
the neck, left their bodies in the cave, mining and then sealing the 
76 
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The Communists, of course, defended their action. Almost immediately 
they turned out a fiery 11 comunicato 11 which denounced the "hard, thick 
morass" of attesismo. They stressed that the guerrilla partisan actions 
in Rome would not cease until the Germans had all been driven out of 
the city. They would continue until the Germans were banished from 
all of Italy, until Fascism was utterly and completely destroyed, and 
77 
until independence and liberty were achieved. Publically the PC! told 
the people that 
(1) it had not known the Germans would react so brutally; 
(2) the Germans did not dare to repeat in Florence or Bologna 
such acts of vengeance as those displayed at the Ardeatine 
Caves; and (3) the only way to check German violence was to 
intensify the underground struggle.78 
Once again the Party emphasized for the people what was for it a most 
important part of Resistance strategy: always fight, always aggress 
against the enemy. 
Unfortunately for the PC!, though the Ardeatine massacre served 
to harden the hearts of a good many Italians towards the Germans and 
the Italian Social Republic, it also caused repercussions for the Party. 
There were those who maintained that the action on the part of the 
Gappisti which resulted in the terrible German revenge exacerbated the 
very attesismo which they had intended to eradicate. Politically, the 
77 
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78 Delzell, p. 375. After the Ardeatine massacre, the terrorist 
attacks continued in other cities. In Florence on April 15, Giovanni 
Gentile, the Fascist idealist-philosopher of education, was shot and 
killed by unidentified youths in a public street. In Bologna the local 
commissioner of the Fascist Federation was assassinated. 
March 23 Rome incident was another element which increased the tension 
already existent within the CCLN, "so that henceforth the leftist 
parties were on the defensive in the Rome conunittee. 1179 
Another criticism of the Communist Party ironically arose out of 
a demonstration of their leadership and organizational capability. In 
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November of 1943 the High Command of the Garibaldini initiated the idea 
of model assault detachments. A sheet was circulated which explained 
the function of such detachments. 
Why model detachments? They are created for armed action, for 
assault, for bold attack. [There are] assault detachments 
because they provide an organization and an iron discipline 
suitable to the tasks before us. [There are] assault detachments 
because their tradition is inscribed in the best popular and 
national traditions, from the Garibaldini of the Risorgimento 
to the glorious Garibaldi brigade of Spain.80 
This circular most certainly responded to the ardent spirit of the 
period, but its tone was typical of all Garibaldini propaganda: it tended 
towards being pompous; it succeeded in ignoring the conditions of the 
real struggle; finally, it encouraged Garibaldini to sing their own praises 
81 
and to tell inflated stories of their accomplishments. The Communists 
would also exhort their fellow fighters to steal arms from the enemy 
because they were needed in order to continue the war effort: "Le 
82 
armi sono quelle che hail nemico, a cui bisogna strapparle." 
Such passionate words were perhaps needed for many of those who were 
79 Delzell, 
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Politics, 11 the section on the Bonomi ministries. 
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reluctant to fight the enemy, but they also were an over-simplification. 
They demonstrated an excessive faith in connnandments or rules, though 
this was quite understandable coming from a party whose members were 
religious-like in their allegiance. 83 Thus, though the Communists 
demonstrated exceptional leadership and organizational qualities during 
the Resistance movement, they were not always acclaimed. 'lllere were 
those who felt, and they documented their feelings, that at times they 
pushed too hard and too much, often to the detriment of others in the 
overall Resistance movement. 
PCI participation in the Resistance was successful in that the 
Germans and the Fascists went down to defeat. It was not successful 
in that the party's second purpose for participating in the movement 
was not realized. It was not able to effect the political, economic, 
and social change it had hoped for. Because of the strength of the 
conservative, traditional elements in Italian society and because of the 
presence of Allied troops on Italian soil, the Communists and their plans 
for a new order were effectively neutralized. An examination of exactly 
why they failed goes beyond present purposes. What is being asserted 
here, and examined, is the fact that the PCI was oriented politically 
as well as militarily in its participation in the Resistance. A study 
of the PCI and its political movements during the period 1943-1945 
offers ample evidence that the Party utilized every opportunity to 
broaden its base of power: it was intent upon reinforcing its position 
in the norhtern CLNs and in employing that position to "reshape the 
patterns of Italy's public life. 84 Concomitantly, the actions of the 
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Allies towards the Communists also implied that they feared the potential 
power of the PCI. 
When the CLNAI was created in January, 1944, it was quickly 
apparent that it was dominated by the leftist parties, and in particular 
by the Communist Party. Because of this, from the beginning it, like 
85 most northern CLNs posited a revolutionary program. One of the first 
directives dispatched by the CLNAI was at the instigation of the PCI, 
and it left no doubt as to the Party's future political intentions. 
There will be no place tomorrow among us for a reactionary 
regime, however masked, nor for a limp democracy. The new 
political, social, and economic system will not be other than 
a clear and effective democracy. The CLN of today is a pre-
figuration of the government of tomorrow. In tomorrow's 
government this is certain: workers, peasants, artisans, all 
the popular classes will have a determining weight, and a 
place adequate to this weight; .•. 86 
The PC! was saying plainly and publicly that the old order would have 
to be destroyed. The rigid privileged class structure would have to 
give way to a society in which all classes had equal say. The Party 
hinted at the concept that the uncorrupted CLNs would be the vehicles 
by which the necessary social, economic, and political change would be 
wrought. In its CLNAI order the PC! revealed how seriously it "dreamed 
of the regeneration of the nation by its own new 'democratic elite'." 87 
In addition to the above declaration of the PCI via the CLNAI 
apparatus, the same directive issued by the Milan organ also stated 
the following; 
85 Clough, Saladino, p. 527. 
86 Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge, 1956), p. 103. 
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... and a place adequate to this weight will be held by the 
parties which represent them. Among these is the Communist 
Party, which is included in the CLN on a plane of perfect parity 
with the other parties, with equal fulness of authority today 
and of power tomorrow ..• Against the affirmations of anti-
communist proposals .•. we must reaffirm the unity ••• that links the 
five parties. Whoever works against this union of them works 
against the Nation. We direct this warning especially to certain 
industrial and financial circles.88 
Thus, the Communists used the CLNAI to their advantage. It was a 
base from which they could operate to publicize and to organize their 
political objectives for the reshaping of Italian society. It also 
provided a forum where they could reinforce their party position, and 
therefore their power. In terms of numbers alone the leftist parties 
in the CLNAI "overawed" the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, and 
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custom in the Po Valley region did not dictate unanimity in CLN voting 
as was the case in the CCLN. 89 
Another way in which the Communists demonstrated their political 
orientation throughout the Resistance was their activity through the 
CLNs to set up local governments wherever the Germans had been success-
fully driven out. Through this process they were establishing models for 
self-government which would be workable and useful towards their aims 
in the postwar rebuilding period. When the partisans succeeded in 
liberating an area such as an Apennine valley, they set about administrating 
the area basing their methods on those utilized by the Yugoslavian 
partisans. They attempted to set up two sets of forces. One was 
designed to be on the alert for any enemy counterattack. The other was 
responsible for fashioning some form of government or administration for 
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the population. These partisan republics, as they can be termed, 
provided the local citizens with "their first experience in partial 
self-government in more than two decades. 1190 
In order to facilitate the organization of a workable governing 
situation CLNs located in the area, or at times the patriot band which 
106 
had liberated the valley, set up giunte popolari annninistrative (popular 
administrative juntas). These juntas supplanted any military regulatory 
body. 91 The PCI was as much as possible a present and an integral 
part of this process of establishing self-government. The Garibaldini 
usually sent into the area "civil delegates;" these were individuals 
who were skilled in organizational methods like the political commissars, 
but who, unlike the commissars, had no military duties. These delegates 
would lay the groundwork for elections. According to the Communists, the 
composition of the juntas was such that they were representative of the 
social class make-up of the area in which they functioned. Thus, the 
PCI established a pattern whereby the selection of candidates for office 
gave the majority of seats "to the poorest classes who were in the majority 
92 
in the countryside." In addition to mapping out the political complexion 
of the liberated areas, the juntas also dealt with the distribution of 
food, tried to hold down prices, and issued commercial licenses. It is 
interesting to note that one of the more successful republics was that 
of the Republic of Carnia located in the Venetia-Julia. Here, from the 
beginning, the Communists were the "propelling force" in the local CLN. 
90 Delzell, p. 417. 
91 Delzell, p. 417. 
92 
Delzell, p. 417. 
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Once again their aggressiveness and serious intent was demonstrated. 
They vigorously set about to organize their administrative unit. Im.med-
iately they broadened the base of the CLN by inviting "youth fronts, 
defense of women groups, and other fringe mass agencies" to join the 
Committee in establishing a "popular progressive democracy." Also, in 
keeping with the PCI line, the purge was enacted in Carnia, with people's 
tribunals set up to carry out the cleansing process.93 
The importance of the establishment of the republics by the 
partisans in northern Italy did not go unnoticed by the Allies. In fact, 
they viewed them as an "implied threat to the authority of the recognized 
94 government in liberated Italy... The particular case of the creation 
of the Republic of Domodossola in the Alps points out the seriousness with 
which the Allies regarded this leftist venture concerning the republics. 
In October, 1944, Val d'Ossola located in the Alps fell to the partisans. 
They proceeded to establish headquarters at Domodossola, the most 
populous center in the area. They declared the creation of the Republic 
of Domodossola, but the partisans did not stop there. They publicized 
their intentions of extending the Republic until it was the Republic of 
Italy. Though the Communists were not the prime movers in Domodossola--
there was considerable conflict between the leftist and the rightists 
over the setting up of an administrative agency--their presence and 
the incident itself serve to illustrate that "there were some political 
misgivings regarding the future behavior of the Communists developing 
in the minds of Churchill and other British officials (and some American 
93 
Delzell, p. 430. 
94 
Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 106. 
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II 95 
ones too in Italy ... They were becoming particularly nervous as 
events in Poland, Greece, and other places in eastern Europe unfolded; 
therefore the Allies did not hesitate to react to what they regarded as 
a threat to their policy being enacted in Italy. At an Allied Control 
Council meeting, shortly after the announcement promulgating the 
Republic of Domodossola, it was announced that "publicity on Patriot 
activities would now be definitely played down particularly behind the 
Allied lines. 1196 Future policy dictated .that more of the spotlight be 
given to those in the Italian army instead of showering the partisans 
with glorious publicity. 
It is useful to note at this juncture that from the beginning 
(autumn of 1943) there was conflict between the Allies and the partisans 
centering on each group's ideas of what the role and the objectives of 
the partisans should be. The disagreement was political in nature. On 
the one side the partisans wanted to organize large contingents of men 
so that their campaigns would be successful and they would be able to 
keep control of the territory they had captured. The allies, on the 
other hand, clearly did not approve of this. They suspected the leftist 
partisan elements, which after all provided the leadership of the 
Resistance movement. They saw in their demands for large armies a 
direct threat to the Italian government already established in the 
South and supported by the Allies as the only legitimate government now 
97 
and in the future. They did not want to allow a situation in Italy 
95 432. Delzell, p. 
96 
Italy and the Allies, 106. Kogan, P· 
97 Italy and the Allies, 102. Kogan, P· 
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whereby the partisans in capturing territories would establish their own 
governments in the areas, and in the end would use these governments to 
defy the authority of the Italian government already set up in the 
liberated portion of the country. 
The establishment of the CLNAI by the Milan CLN in January, 1944 
in effect brought about the political unity of the Resistance. Tilere was, 
however, no real mechanism in existence which could coordinate the military 
activities of the movement. 1be partisans groups continued to function 
as individual entities until military consolidation took place in the 
spring of the same year. At that time some organization among the units 
was instituted. Detachments 
(about 450 men) and brigades 
(about fifty men) were organized into brigades 
98 ~nto divisions (about 1350men). Tilough 
this organizational activity was a beginning, it was not enough; there 
was too much competition between different political groupings, and at 
times actual fighting broke out among them. In order to stop this 
useless internal conflict, and in an effort to streamline military 
operations, the CLNAI created its own organ for the task in June, 1944. 
On the 9th of June it launched the General Headquarters, Corps of Volun-
99 
teers of Liberty (CG/CVL) in Milan. 
man 
A hierarchical military structure embracing all partisan units 
associated with the political parties, by this time the great 
majority, was thus established. Regional military commands 
were set up to work with the regional CLNs.100 
The conflict which evolved between General Raffaele Cadorna, the 
appointed by Premier Bonomi to serve as military advisor to the CG/CVL, 
98 Kogan, I tall and ilie Allies, p. 104. 
99 
Kogan, I tall ~d the Allies, p. 104. 
100 Kogan, I tall and ilie Allies, p. 104. 
and the PCI (ftlong with other leftists) offers another illustration of 
the Conununists' determination to maintain its leadership position in 
the Resistance. When General Cadorna arrived in Milan to take up his 
position, there developed a long period of misunderstandings and dis-
agreements between him and the CLNAI concerning his duties and "pero-
gatives. 11 
..• the general argued that he could not serve very helpfully 
as 'technical consultant' in irregular guerrilla warfare; 
what he hoped to do was transform the Resistenza Armata into 
an efficient fighting force that would be loyal to the govern-
ment in Rome and have no political overtones of its own.101 
He further indicated that it was his task, at the behest of the Allied 
110 
Supreme Headquarters, to take over the command of the northern military 
forces. From the beginning Cadorna's plans were supported by the 
parti~s of the right, the PLI and the DC, as well as by the Autonomi 
leadership. The PCI, on the other hand, stood in direct opposition to 
him and to his proposed role. Fundamentally, they distrusted Cadorna 
and his possible future actions. They noted that he was accompanied by 
a British major, Major Churchill, who make no secret of his anti-CLNAI 
sentiments. They suspected that if Cadorna actually took over the 
direction of the northern forces, officers loyal to the King, and to 
what the King stood for, would then "infiltrate CVL headquarters and 
102 
compromise the political autonomy of the entire underground." Thus, 
the PCI dragged its feet concerning Cadorna's interpretation of his role. 
In fact, the Party was able to win in this particular conflict. The 
disagreement itself lasted for a long time; it was not until February 
of 1945, through many ups and downs for Cadorna including an attempted 
101 Delzell, p. 414. 
102Delzell, p. 415. 
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resignation on his part, that an agreement was finally reached. Io that 
agreement Cadorna acquiesced to the fact that his role was subordinate 
to that of the CLNAI as long as he was not issued orders in conflict 
with those issued by the Allies or the CCLN. Cadorna had finally 
succumbed to the hard line maintained by the CLNAI since the beginning 
of the conflict in June, 1944. The Connnittee for the Liberation of 
Upper Italy had made clear to him its stance. The CG/CVL was a 
working section of the CLNAI. It is evident, therefore, that 
where the Command must take decisions and issue orders having 
political character, it is impossible to proceed except through 
the collegial consultation of all its members who at that 
moment represent the CLNAI, which is the body from which their 
power derives •.. 103 
There is no question that the Communists wanted power and that they 
continually agitated to achieve that status and to extend it. Throughout 
the Resistance to the very eve of the liberation in 1945, they continually 
prodded and pushed to be recognized intheir goals. In August, 1944 
a notice was circulat~d by the CLNAI in occupied Italy which stated 
that it, the CLNAI, was the representative of the Italian government and 
in being so possessed the powers of the government. The notice went a 
step further by giving the authority to the CLNs of the regions and 
104 
provinces to act likewise. Pushing their actions further, the follow-
ing month the Upper Northern Committee sent a representative directly to 
the Allies to obtain their recognition as the representative of the 
Italian government in occupied territory. The Allies of course denied 
the request. Since they habitually became the governmental authority 
103 Delzell, p. 484. 
104 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 106. 
in just liberated regions, they did not want to be interfered with by 
105 local CLNs who injected and demanded their own priorities. 
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Because the partisan effort was of meaningful value to the Allies, 
an agreement as to their status was eventually achieved, though it 
was not to their long-range advantage. When in December, 1944 Fremier 
Bonomi agreed to recognize the CLNAI as the Italian government's dele-
gate with full powers to that part of Italy which was occupied, it 
looked like a victory for the leftists and the Communists. In effect 
it was not, for the terms of the armistice precluded that possibility. 
The terms had already dictated that the Italian government seated in 
Rome was held by the Allied Governments to be "the sole successor of 
the Government •.• and ••• the only legitimate authority in that part of 
Italy which has been, or will later be restored to the Italian Govern-
106 
ment by the Allied Military Government." 
On May Day, the eve of the surrender of the German armies in 
Italy, the political movements of the PCI were still in high gear. 
It continued to prod the Italian leaders and the Italian people into 
radically changing the structure of their society. On that first day 
of May, Luigi Longo, the long-time clandestine Communist leader and 
veteran of the Spanish Civil War, exhorted the people to demand of the 
Roman government that the direction for the new popular progressive 
democracy begin now. He charged the Italians with making clear to 
Rome the following: 
(1) The northern patriots are not at all pleased with the 
wishy-washy way in which the purge was proceeding in the South. 
lOSKogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 106. 
106Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 107. 
(2) A new, 'popular' goverrunent must be placed in the hands of 
'energetic, determined' men who never have compromised with 
Fascism and who have known how 'to accomplish the miracle of 
liberating their country.' 'It must be tied solidly to the 
masses and popular organizations arising out of the fire of the 
insurrection.' (3) There must be wide participation by 
workers in factory administration. 'We demand ..• that workers, 
clerks, and technicians participate in the manner set forth by 
the CLNAI in its decree regarding the administration of pro-
duction on a level of absolute equality with the owners. 1 107 
W7 Delzell, p. 557. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EPILOGUE 
Though politically they prodded here and pushed there throughout 
the Resistance, gaining ground at times, losing it at others, the 
Communists were not able to succeed in their program to revolutionize 
Italian society. In 1945 the situation in Italy seemed to be one 
of imminent political and social revolution. The working classes, 
agitated by the experience of fighting a war through a decisive role 
in the Resistance and impressed with the success of the Communists in 
Eastern Europe seemed impatient and eager to better tneir lives thro.ugh 
1 
a radical reform of their society. But nothing happened in Italy . 
.•• the revolution failed to occur. Three years after the 
revolutionary high tide of May and June 1945, the forces of 
conservatism won an overwhelming electoral victory. In . 
exactly the same length of time as it had tak~n the earlier 
wave of protest to spend itself, [referring to the post World 
War I atmosphere in Italy] the second flood of Italian revolu-
tionary consciousness had ended in frustration and disillu-
sionment. 2 
For the PCI, on the eve of the liberation from the Germans, Luigi 
3 
Longo had expressed the highest of hopes. The difficulty, however, 
"of sustaining a revolutionary politics in an arena--parliament 
1 H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, 1953), 
p. 143. 
2 Hughes, p. 143. 
3see Chapter V, "The PCI and the Resistance." 
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4 
that deals primarily in a politics of interest ••• " proved too complex. 
It took only two, very short years, until May, 1947, for the PCI, 
accused of not promoting "solidarity within the state administration 
and in the legislation on public matters," to lose its well-cultivated 
representation in the government, a position it has not retrieved for 
some twenty-nine years. 5 In viewing briefly the period from 1945, 
when the PCI still participated in the government as part of a six party 
coalition, to 1947 when it was "expelled," two factors are clear: 
Togliatti's party had failed in the realization of its economic objectives, 
and it had failed in maintaining its irmnediate political objective, that 
of participating in the government. 
The "labor arm" of the Communist Party was the Italian General 
Confederation of Labor (CGIL) which had been created in 1944 through 
the fusion of the Marxist-dominated General Confederation of Labor 
(CGL) and the Catholic Italian Confederation of Laborers, both pre-
6 Fascist trade unions. In 1946 through the CGIL the PCI put forth its 
economic objectives: 
4 
Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven, 
1967), p. 128. 
5 . Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United States and 
the Communist Parties in France and Italy, 1945-1947," Studies in 
Comparative Communism An International Interdisciplinary Journal, VIII 
(Spring and Summer, 1975), p. 143. 
6 When the CGIL was created by the Pact of Rome in 1944, the 
three mass parties, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the 
Connnunists shared in its leadership. From the beginning, however, the 
Communists, under the guiding hand of Giuseppe Di Vittorio, began to 
take over the leadership. In 1949 the Christian Democrats left the 
CGIL and formed their own Italian Confederation of Trade Unions called 
CSIL. (Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries 
(Ithaca, 1961), pp. 454-473. 
In the industrial field, the party proposes the nationali-
zation of large monopolistic combines, big banks and insurance 
companies; the institution of national planning and of a 
system of national control of production, the first step 
in which will be the general establishment and recognition of 
management councils. 7 
In effect the PCI was advocating a dual control of indwitry. As a 
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first and necessary step towards the realization of their broader economic 
program the management councils would include both representatives of 
the workers and representatives of the factory owners. It was for the 
Party a major move towards the viability of the principle that workers as 
well as employers have the right to an imput as to "how and according to 
what criteria the productive factors which they represented should be 
. 8 
combined." During this early postwar period the PCI through its 
leadership role in the CGIL attempted to achieve this concept of dual 
control by establishing worker-management councils in industry, a modern 
form of Gramsci's Consigli of 1919-20. They were unsuccessful. To 
Italian private enterprise, the idea of sharing decisions with its employees 
was inconceivable; consequently, it exerted pressure on the government in 
Rome to veto the CGIL solution to economic recovery problems. Rome was 
quite responsive to this entrepreneurial pressure, as well as to 
foreign pressures from the West, and in the immediate postwar liberation 
period the government denied legal recognition to the existence of 
worker-management councils. As a result, the idea of councils, as well 
as a few which had in fact existed from pre-liberation days, disappeared 
7Fulvio Bellini, "The Italian CP Part II: The Transformation 
of a Party 1921-1945," Problems of Communism, V (January-February, 1956), 
p. 42. 
8 . Bellini, Part II, p. 43. 
in 1945 and 1946, and though the Constitution of 1947 affirmed their 
right to exist, they never flourished. 
In general, the revolutionary consigli di gestione [management 
councils] were superseded by less pretentious commissioni 
interne ('internal commissions,' or shop-stewards' committees), 
which had originated early in the century as liaison agencies 
between management and labor for the settlement of disputes 
over labor contracts ••• In their postwar incarnation these 
shop-stewards' committees operated chiefly as conciliatory and 
liaison bodies between management and labor, and were consulted 
in certain disciplinary and purge cases, in modifying ~ours of 
labor, and in administration of social-security funds. 
Thus, by the end of the year 1947, it was clear that the ideas of the 
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Communists in the economic sphere had not succeeded even at the initial 
stage. Instead of an economy which offered an environment in which the 
worker could have his say concerning production, to the contrary, the 
Italian economy was being restructured in the old, pre-Fascist mold of 
private enterprise with the owners of industry being in firm and absolute 
control. 
Shortly after returning to Italy in 1944, Togliatti had made it 
very clear to Italians in general and to his fellow party members that 
"We are no longer a sect of agitators but have assumed the responsibility 
of a great party. 1110 Implicit in his words was the overriding desire 
for the PCI to participate in the government and in this they succeeded, 
but only for a very brief period. When the Parri government fell in 
November, 1945, Alcide De Gasperi the leader of the Christian Democrats 
was chosen as the best hope to form a new government. (Between 1945 
and 1953 he would head eight Italian cabinets.) From the beginning 
9
charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies The Italian Anti-
Fascist Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 558. 
10 Bellini, Part II, p. 42. 
118 
tension grew between the Right and Center and the Left. This first 
De Gasperi government still consisted of the six party coalition 
which had existed throughout the 1943-1945 war years, but it was the 
last time that all the parties would work together. 
During his first term in office two major acts carried out by 
De Gasperi indicated a move to the right politically. First he began 
the removal of local adtdnistrators who had been appointed by the CLNs 
in the northern provinces inunediately after the Liberation. He 
replaced them with officials who had been the very bureaucrats before 
and during Fascism that the Communists wanted no part of in the 
11 
restructuring of Italian society. Second, he endorsed an indefinite 
termination of the purge trials. This again was in direct opposition 
to the insistence of the Communists and other leftists that Italy must 
be cleansed of those elements which had made it possible for Fascism to 
exist. Further, they were adamant that these same elements not be 
allowed to hold office or other responsible positions in society, a 
factor which did not receive support through De Gasperi's termination 
act. Though during this same time period the PCI was able to demonstrate 
strength among the people--out of 7,572 administrative districts the joint 
Socialist-Communist ticket received 2,256 in the administrative elections 
of March 10, 1946, and in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of 
June 2, 1946, the Communists received 104 seats along with the Socialists' 
115--tension caused by disagreement in policy continued to mount among 
12 the parties serving in the government. 
11 Giuseppe Mammarella, Italy After Fascism A Political History 
1943-1965 (Notre Dame, 1966), p. 107. 
12 
Mammarella, pp. 108 and 116. 
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The second De Gasperi government inaugurated in July, 1946, 
ushered in the "tripartite coalition." In actuality there were four 
parties represented in this cabinet. In addition to the Christian 
Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists, the Republican Party 
had also entered the coalition. They remained, however, isolated from 
the other three parties; their political clout was miniscule in com-
parison to them. During this round of government the conflict between 
the Christian Democrats on one hand, and the Communists and the Socialists 
on the other hand, which had begun to come into sharp focus during the 
initial months of De Gasperi's leadership became even more apparent. 
For one, in their efforts to begin work on rebuilding Italy economically, 
the Christian Democrats chose to support an economic policy which 
openly favored and encouraged private enterprise while the Communists 
promulgated eradication of monopolistic methods, the institution of 
national control of production, and the establishment of national planning 
(discussed above). For another, De Gasperi continued in his campaign 
to dismiss CLN appointed officials. The prefects who had been designated 
by the CLNs after Liberation were either discharged from their duties 
or forced to submit their resignations. The plan of the PCI to restructure 
Italian society with new and forward looking party advocates failed. 
De Gasperi replaced the CLN prefects with "career functionaries of 
13 
conservative, anti-Connnunist sentiment." 
Perhaps the most damaging action, as far as the Communists and 
their program was concerned, was De Gasperi's conscious move to keep the 
important Foreign and Interior ministries' portfolios from them. 
13 Mammarella, p. 136. 
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In substance, the aim of De Gasperi and the DC was to 
deprive the left-wing parties of their most effective weapon, 
that of political pressure exercised through their control of 
the masses. The righ~ maintained that it was ·only by reestab-
lishing an atmosphere of security that conditions favorable to 
the development of private initiative and the reconstruction could 
be created. With this goal in view, De Gasperi, who in additinn 
to the tasks of Prime Minister also held the portfolio of the 
Minister of the Interior and as such was responsible for public 
order, undertook to reinforce the police organs in order to 
reconstitute the weapon traditionally at the service of the 
state and the political forces in power.14 
Within the same framework De Gasperi also launched a program, beginning 
in Emilia, of searching for and rounding up arms caches left over from 
the Resistance movement. The searches for weapons which continued for 
several years and which spread to other sections in northern and central 
Italy netted a vast store of arms material. The salient point is that 
many of the weapons gathered were found in the hands of Communist 
party members, and the Christian Democrats along with right wing elements 
in the society utilized this fact to their political advantage: they 
preyed on the fears cf the Italian upper and middle classes by insisting 
that the presence of weapons affirmed the "existence of a paramilitary 
organization supported by the Communist Party," and they piously 
15 
condemned the threat that it posed to Italian democracy. 
The PCI expressed adamant opposition to De Gaspari and his 
tactics. They answered his accusations by denouncing him and his 
actions in the cabinet and stirring up the population to resist his 
course of action which they assured the people was a ploy to restore 
power to those who had condoned and supported the Fascist regime. 
Because of a shake-up in the Socialist Party--it split into 
two factions at its national congress in January, 1947--and the consequent 
14 Mammarella, p. 135. 
15 Mammarella, p. 136. 
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resignations it triggered in the Ltalian government, De Gasperi dissolved 
his second government in January of 1947. 16 He formed a new cabinet in 
February. The Communists and the Nenni Socialists, plus two indepen-
dents joined him. During this snort government--from February to 
May--11 the open political conflict between the Communists and the 
17 Christian Democrats ••• had by now reached the breaking point." For 
the parties in power more problems awaited solution, and the process 
did not invite agreement. The two parties were unable to come to an 
accord on the immediate problem of inflation. One wanted to freeze 
salaries and cut public spending. The other met this proposal with 
unyielding opposition. At the international level tension increased 
as a result of the Truman doctrine. 
The Communists, in line with Moscow policy, condemned the 
Truman Doctrine and compared its aims to 'ideological political 
motivations analogical to those habitual to German imperialism.' 
The Christian Democrats and the entire moderate and conservative 
opinion extolled Truman's decision, s~eing in it as well a 
guarantee for the security of Italy.18 
All of these factors which had been putting stress upon the 
coalition governments causing friction between the Right and the Left, 
between the Christian Democrats and the Communists, finally came to 
16 
On January 9, Giuseppe Saragat and Matteo Matteotti, the 
moderates of the PSIUP, walked out of the national congress and formed 
the Socialist Party of the Italian Workers (PSLI). They opposed the 
wing of the PSIUP which wanted continued collaboration with the PCI. 
The part of the party left under the leadership of Nenni re-adopted 
the original name of the Socialist Party, Partitio Socialista Italiano 
(PSI). 
17 
Mammarella, p. 144. 
18 Mammarella, p. 145. 
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rupture. In late April, 1947, De Gasperi publically denounced the 
PCI as being uncooperative and disloyal to the solidarity of the 
government. He appealed for someone, some group to work with him in 
"concrete collaboration. 11 On May 12 he resigned from his third govern-
ment. When he was charged to form his fourth, he did not ask the PCI 
to join. In fact, on the last day of May, 1947, he formed the first 
postwar one-party government. 
De Gasperi's fourth government marked the end of a period which 
had existed since 1943. The collaboration between the anti-Fascist 
parties was a thing of the past. More importantly, the position for 
which the PCI had compromised and maneuvered was lost to it: it no 
longer was a participant in the government. 
During the next year the Christian Democrats were able to make 
the gains they needed to stay in power. Their most important objective 
of combating inflation and stabilizing the lira bore results within 
months of initiation of their program. Further, the Party was able to 
withstand two non-confidence votes in the Constituent Assembly. In 
19 . During De Gasperi's second government (which began in July, 
1946) UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) 
assistance to Italy ended. In December of 1946 De Gasperi traveled 
to the United States, and the question of U.S. post-UNRRA aid for Italy 
was discussed. Though the U.S. Government did not explicitely state that 
it would not give aid to the Italians if the Communists were allowed to 
continue as participants in the government of De Gasperi, in Senator 
Vandenberg's words, the United States did "not want to waste [its] 
resources aiding tendencies that are contrary to [its] principles and [its] 
goal of internal and international dempcracy." In the latter part of 
1947, after the Communists had in fact been dropped from De Gasperi 1 s 
fourth cabinet, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy sent the following Top 
Secret communique to Washington: "Now that a government has been 
formed by the Christian Democrats .•.. with outside experts but without 
Communists or their affiliates I recommend most strongly that our 
government take whatever steps may be possible to demonstrate our 
support and readiness to aid in their efforts to save the lira and secure 
their economy." Pressure from the United States, then, was yet another 
factor leading up to De Gasperi's PCI policy. (Serfaty, pp. 137-144.) 
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fact, it became clear that the Christian Democratic experiment in 
government, without the Communists participating, was working. Consequently, 
in the middle of December, 1946, the Republicans and the Social Demo-
crats agreed to work with the Christian Democrats, and a new government 
of four parties was formed which was to last for almost five years, 
and was to provide a reasonably long period of political stability and 
which was to make reconstruction a reality. Having been unable to dis-
credit the viability of the Christian Democrats, the Communists, now 
having been out of the government for almost a year, prepared for the 
all important general political elections to be held in April, 1948. 
They had failed to produce revolution in Italy, and these elections 
were the last chance for the Communists to take the lead from the 
consolidation forces of the Christian Democrats and the Republicans 
and the Social Democrats. 
Psychologically, in terms of the improved economic situation, the 
Christian Democrats had an edge. The middle and upper classes felt 
better about the ways things were going in Italy. During the period 
before the elections, the international situation caused considerable 
concern and posed an issue which the De Gasperi government was able to 
use to its advantage. The gradual absorption of Eastern European 
countries into the orbit of Soviet control and the build-up of Soviet 
troops along East-West borders was made into a campaign issue, and the 
Christian Democrats hammered away at the fact that this election would 
decide whether Italy would be free .to decide her own political destiny 
or whether she also would succumb to Communism. With the East-West 
Cold War in its initial stages, both the Soviet Union and the United 
States watched the Italian election with interest; in fact, each did 
124 
more. Both major powers contributed to the campaign which would enhance 
the prospect of an Italy firmly tied to an alliance with them. 
For the Connnunists the elections of 1948 produced a bitter 
aftermath for all the energies they had expended against Fascism and 
for the restructuring and rebuilding of Italy. The Christian Democrats 
won a decisive victory with a little over 48 percent of the vote 
while the Communists and the Socialists, on a combined Popular Front 
ticket, gathered only 31 percent of the vote, almost one million fewer 
20 
votes than they had received in the 1946 elections. It appeared that 
the Christian Democratic decision to rule without the PCI had been 
confirmed. 
20 Maromarella, p. 194. 
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APPENDIX 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
JANUARY, 1943-DECEMBER, 1946 
Allies land in Sicily. 
AMGOT begins to function in Sicily. 
First bombing of Rome 
Hitler and Mussolini meet at Feltre. 
Meeting of the Fascist Grand Council. 
Grandi's motion accepted by a two-thirds majority. 
Mussolini dimissed and arrested. 
Marshal Badoglio becomes Prime Minister. 
Martial Law proclaimed in Italy. 
Badoglio forms a Cabinet Fascist Party dissolved. 
Capture of Catania. 
End of resistance in Sicily. 
Armistice signed in Sicily by General Castellano, 
but not announced. 
First Allied landing on Italian mainland, in 
Calabria. 
Announcement of armistice. Italy surrenders 
unconditionally. 
Allied landing at Salerno. 
Rome occupied by German troops. 
Italian fleet makes formal surrender at Malta. 
King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio withdraw to Bari. 
Mussolini set free by the Germans. 
Mussolini organizes the Republican Fascist Party 
and assumes supreme direction of Fascism in Italy. 
Pavolini appointed temporary Secretary. 
Mussolini makes statement on German radio. 
Germans evacuate Sardinia. 
Formation of the neo-Fascist Government announced. 
Offensive by Fifth Army from Salerno opens. 
Full armistice terms signed by Badoglio at Malta. 
Badoglio forms preliminary Cabinet. 
Allies enter Naples. 
Count Sforza arrives in Italy. 
Italy declares war on Germany and becomes a co-
belligerent of the Allies. 
Broadcast of declaration of Moscow Conference 
(19-30 October) on Italy. 
Formation of Allied Control Commission for Italy . 
General Roatta removed from post of Chief of 
Staff, Italian Army. 
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14 November 
16 November 
28 December 
1944 
8 January 
11 January 
22 January 
28 January 
11 February 
13 March 
15 March 
23 March 
26 March 
4 April 
17 April 
20 April 
23 April 
11 May 
18 May 
22 May 
25 May 
4 June 
5 June 
6 June 
..., June I 
9 June 
22 June 
Early July 
15 July 
18 July 
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First National Assembly of the Republican Fascist 
Party at Verona, Manifesto embodying draft 
Constitution of Italian Social Republic issued. 
Badoglio forms Cabinet. 
Ortona captured by Eighth Army. 
Trial of Ciano and other members of Fascist Grand 
Council opens at Verona. 
Ciano and four others shot. 
Allied forces land at Anzio. 
Bari Congress of the six parties represented on the 
Conunittees of National Liberation. 
Transfer of Allied-occupied territory to the Badoglio 
Government, i.e. of territory south of northern 
boundaries of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari provinces, 
and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. 
Diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. resumed. 
Fifth Army launches offensive at Cassino. 
Fosse Ardeatine murders. 
Togliatti returns to Italy. 
Sir Noel Charles appointed High Couunissioner for 
Italy. 
Badoglio resigns; asked by King to form new 
Government. 
Badoglio forms a new Ministry on a broader basis. 
Mussolini meets Hitler in Germany. 
Allies launch large offensive on Gustav Line. 
Capture of Cassino. 
General Alexander issues first Italian partisan 
communique. 
Fifth Army link up with Anzio beachhead. 
Allies enter Rome 
King of Italy signs a decress making Prince Umberto 
Lieutenant General of the Realm. 
D Day 
General Alexander makes first broadcast to 
Italian patriots in North Italy. 
Ivanoe Bonomi forms a new Government. 
Ministers take oath; Bonomi Cabinet's first 
meeting at Salerno. 
Strikes in Northern towns; partisans active. 
Germans taking over authority (especially military) 
from neo-Fascists. 
Bonomi Government transfers from Salerno to Rome. 
Poles capture Ancona. 
Partisans to be incorporated in the Italian 
army organization. 
1944 
19 July 
20 July 
21 July 
27 July 
2 August 
5 August 
8 August 
10 August 
13 August 
15 August 
End August 
18 September 
27 September 
4 October 
16 October 
16 November 
20 November 
26 November 
28 November 
5 December 
10 December 
14 December 
1945 
15 January 
18 January 
24 February 
4 March 
8 March 
22 March 
31 March 
U.S. forces occupy Leghorn. 
Provinces of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento, 
Avellino, and Naples (except commune of Naples) 
transferred to Italian Government jurisdiction 
Mussolini received by Hitler (after attempt on 
Hitler's life on 20th). 
Epuration law passed. 
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Graziani appointed c.-in-C. of new army of Italian 
and German divisions. 
Eighth Army occupies Florence south of the Arno. 
Communist-Socialist joint programme of action 
issued. 
Mr. Churchill in Italy till 28th. 
Florence clear of Germans. 
Provinces of Littoria, Frosinone, and Rome, and 
town of Rome restored to Italian Government 
jurisdiction. 
Gothic Line reached. 
Caruso's trial. 
Churchill-Roosevelt declaration regarding status of 
Italy. 
Mr. Eden's statement in House of Commons regard-
ing Italian colonies. 
Provinces of Viterbo, Rieti, Aquila, Chieti, 
Pescara, and Teramo pass under Italian Government 
jurisdiction. 
General Roatta arrested 
Count Carandini arrives in London as Italian 
representative 
Cabinet crisis; Bonomi resigns. 
British objections to Count Sforza's candidature 
as Foreign Minister. 
Eighth Army occupies Ravenna. 
Second Bonomi Government announced; Socialists 
and Action Party refuse to collaborate. 
Canadian troops enter Faenza. 
Allied direct control over Italian press ends. 
Tarchiani appointed Italian Ambassador in Washington. 
Mr. Harold MacMillan's announcement regarding 
relaxation of conditions hitherto limiting Italian 
Government's freedom of action. 
General Roatta escapes during trial. 
Agreement signed between Italian Government and 
U.N.R.R.A. representative in Italy. 
Mussolini's speech on 26th anniversary of the 
foundation of Fasci di Combattimento. 
Council of Ministers approves proposal for "Consulta." 
1945 
2 April 
10 April 
14 April 
19 April 
21 April 
24 April 
25 April 
26 April 
27 April 
28 April 
29 April 
30 April 
1 May 
2 May 
3 May 
5 May 
8 May 
12 May 
13 May 
16 May 
19 May 
22 May 
25 May 
28 May 
1 June 
2 June 
Eighth Army landing near Lake Comacchio. 
Eighth Army crosses the Senio. 
Fifth Army advancing on Bologna. 
Strikes in Turin and Milan begin. 
Capture of Bologna. 
Eighth Army occupies Ferrara. 
Fifth Army enters Mantua and Parma. 
Partisans attack and take over in Milan. 
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Fifth Army occupies Verona and crosses Adige. 
Germans surrender to partisans in Genoa; most of 
Turin in patriot hands. 
C.N.L.A.I. takes over control in North. 
Fifth Army enters Genoa and Piacenza. 
Mussolini arrested at village on Lake Como. 
Mussolini and other leading Fascists, including 
Pavolini and Farinacci, executed by patriots. 
Fifth Army takes Brescia and Bergamo, U.&. 
troops reach Como, Eighth Army reaches Venice and 
Mestre, New Zealand Division reaches the Piave. 
Instrument of surrender of German armies in Italy 
signed at Caserta. 
Patriots liberate Turin. 
Partisans fighting Germans in Trieste. 
Graziani calls on Ligurian armies to lay down arms. 
New Zealand troops reach Udine and make contact 
with Marshal Tito's forces which have entered 
Trieste. 
Surrender of German armies in Italy announced. 
New Zealanders enter Trieste. 
Germans in Trieste surrender to New Zealanders; 
Yugoslavs occupy municipal buildings there. 
C.N.L.A.I. representatives arrives in Rome. 
General Morgan meets Tito in Belgrade and suggests 
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Trieste area. 
Field Marshal Alexander in Belgrade discussing 
Trieste question with Tito. 
C.N.L.A.I. leaders return North. 
Ministers go North for further discussions. 
Field Marshal Alexander issues statement protesting 
against Tito's claims in Venezia Giulia. 
Eighth Army takes over Trieste. 
Six-party agreement reached in Milan as to pro-
gramme for new Government; Ministers return to 
Rome. 
"Cordon sanitaire" between North and South ends. 
A.M.G. (Lombardy) issues order regarding end of 
C.N.L.A.I. authority in North; C.N.L.A.I. decrees 
to be replaced by A.M.G. orders. 
Six-party agreement regarding powers of C.N.L.s. 
1945 
9 June 
12 June 
17 June 
19 June 
20 June 
14 July 
3 August 
4 August 
9 August 
30 August 
15 September 
17 September 
18 September 
19 September 
25 September 
2 October 
3 October 
8 October 
12 October 
18 October 
6 November 
9 November 
15 November 
17 November 
22 November 
24 November 
1 December 
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Agreement signed in Belgrade between British, U.S., 
and Yugoslav Governments defining limits of A.M.G. 
control in Venezia Giulia. 
Bonomi resigns. 
British and Americans take over in Trieste; Yugoslav 
troops withdraw. 
Ferruccio Parri asked to form Government. 
Provinces of Florence, Leghorn, and Pistoia trans-
ferred to Italian Government control. 
Parri Government formed. 
Italo-Yugoslav agreement signed, completing that 
of 9 June, and defining limits of 'Morgan Line.' 
Italy declares war on Japan. 
Potsdam decisions announced; Italy to be admitted 
to U.N.O. after peace treaty concluded. 
Emilia, Apuania, Lucca, and town of Ancona 
handed back to Italian Government control. 
Val d'Aosta Autonomy Bill passed. 
Commission for preparation of electoral law set 
up. 
Lombardy, Veneta, Piedmont, and Liguria restored 
to Italian Government control, leaving Udine, 
Trento, Belluno, and Balzano still under A.M.G. 
Italian Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers, 
headed by De Gasperi, arrives in London. 
Council of Foreign Ministers discusses Italian 
colonies; Russian proposal for trusteeship over 
Tripolitania. 
Council of Foreign Ministers' decisions regarding 
Venezia Giulia--(i) line to be as nearly as possible 
the ethnic one; (ii) Trieste to be internationalized. 
Inaugural meeting of "Consulta." Sforza elected 
President. Separatist risings in Sicily. 
Sicilian Separatist leader Finocchiaro--Aprile 
arrested in Messina. 
Unification of purge measures throughout the 
country. 
Liberal criticisms of Government policy. 
Draft decree on Constituent Assembly prepared. 
Italy re-admitted to I.L.O. 
Armistice terms published. 
New epuration law passed. 
Allied Supreme Command restores control of Italian 
army to Government. 
Liberals propose widening of Government. 
Liberal Ministers resign from Government. 
Parri resigns. 
De Gasperi asked to form Government. 
SOURCE: Muriel Grindrod, The New Italy Transition From War to Peace 
(London, 1947), pp. 104-109. 
